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Abstract
In this paper we examine conditional versus unconditional forecasting with a version of
the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) of the euro area designed for use in the context
of the macroeconomic projection exercises at the European Central Bank (ECB). We
ﬁrst analyse the out-of-sample forecasting properties of the estimated model from 1999
to 2005 by comparing its unconditional forecasts with those obtained from a Bayesian
VAR with a steady-state prior as well as na¨ıve forecasts. Model-based forecasts that
are conditioned on diﬀering information sets are then studied and evaluated through,
for instance, modesty statistics to assess the relevance of the Lucas critique. In contrast
to other studies in the literature, we condition on a fairly large set of policy-relevant
variables. Furthermore, we consider conditioning information that partially, albeit not
fully determine the future path of the observed variables, but which restrict the chan-
nels through which they can be aﬀected.
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1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the development of a new generation of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models that build on explicit micro-foundations with optimising
agents. Major advances in estimation methodology allowed estimating variants of these
models that are able to compete, in terms of data coherence, with more standard time-
series models, such as vector autoregressions (VARs).1 Accordingly, the new generation of
DSGE models provides a framework that appears particularly suited for evaluating the
consequences of alternative macroeconomic policies. More recently, increasing eﬀorts have
been undertaken to use these models also for forecasting purposes.2
In practice, forecasts at policy-making institutions are made conditional on a number
of technical assumptions. In particular, institutional forecasts tend to be conditioned on
a certain path for the nominal interest rate over the forecast horizon.3 However, they are
usually also conditioned on additional information, such as assumptions for the nominal
exchange rate as well as ﬁscal and foreign developments, which may at least partially re-
ﬂect advanced knowledge on the part of experts or market participants. To the extent that
conditioning plays a crucial role in practical forecasting, incorporating conditioning infor-
mation is deemed important for developing modern forecasting tools that are eventually to
be used for forecasting purposes at policy-making institutions. Alternative methodological
approaches for incorporating conditioning assumptions have been proposed for structural
VARs by Waggoner and Zha (1999), Leeper and Zha (2003), and Robertson, Tallman and
Whiteman (2005). These methods have been extended to DSGE models by Smets and
Wouters (2004) and Adolfson, Lase´en, Linde´ and Villani (2005). But so far, empirical stud-
ies have largely focused on the role of conditioning on a path for the nominal interest rate
alone, disregarding additional conditioning information.
In contrast to the existing studies, we examine model-based forecasts that are conditioned
on a fairly large set of policy-relevant variables, namely nominal interest and exchange rates,
but also ﬁscal and foreign variables. For our examination we utilise a version of the New
1See, among others, Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets and Wouters (2007),
and Adolfson, Linde´, Lase´en and Villani (2007).
2See Smets and Wouters (2004), Adolfson, Anderson, Linde´, Villani and Vredin (2005), Adolfson, Linde´
and Villani (2007), and Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2006).
3Historically, the assumption of unchanged interest rates was widespread amongst central banks, whereas
more recently assumptions based on market interest rates (see, e.g., the practices at the Bank of England)
or an “own” interest rate path (see the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Sveriges Riksbank and Norges Bank)
have been more widely utilised. The European Central Bank employed the assumption of unchanged interest
rates until March 2006 and has been using market-based interest rates since then.
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Area-Wide Model (NAWM)—an estimated small open-economy model of the euro area
that has been designed for use in the macroeconomic projection exercises at the European
Central Bank (cf. Christoﬀel, Coenen and Warne, 2007).4 In utilising the NAWM, we allow
for conditioning information that partially, albeit not fully determines the future path of
any particular endogenous variable, but which restricts the channels through which they
can be aﬀected. For instance, the nominal exchanges rate and foreign prices are part of our
conditioning set, while domestic prices are not. The future path of the real exchange rate
can thus only vary with shocks aﬀecting domestic prices. To our knowledge, there is no
study that looks at such a large, policy-relevant conditioning set or conditioning variables
that only partially determine the path of the observed variables.
The conditional forecast approach we apply is based on recursively manipulating certain
structural shocks to ensure that the observed variables are fully consistent with the con-
ditioning information, following Leeper and Zha (1993) and Adolfson, Lase´en, Linde´ and
Villani (2005). Clearly, such conditional forecast experiments may be subject to the Lucas
(1976) critique since the shocks that need to be adjusted may behave very diﬀerently from
what is assumed in the model and thereby give rise to changes in agents’ beliefs about
the model’s structure. To assess the relevance of the Lucas critique, we evaluate the con-
ditional forecasts through “modesty statistics”, which were originally proposed by Leeper
and Zha (2003) for structural VAR analysis as a simple metric for evaluating how unusual
a conditional forecast of a variable is relative to an unconditional forecast. The underlying
idea is to compare the shocks that are adjusted over the conditioning sample with values
drawn from the estimated distribution of the shocks. If the behavior of the adjusted shocks
over the conditioning sample is very diﬀerent from that implied by the model, then the
conditioning information need no longer be modest and instead be subject to the Lucas
critique. Adolfson et al. (2005) extended Leeper and Zha’s idea from structural VARs to
DSGE models subsequently, also taking the multivariate nature of the underlying shock
uncertainty into account.5
4While there exists a calibrated two-country version of the NAWM comprising the euro area and the
United States (cf. Coenen, McAdam and Straub, 2007), the estimated version maintains the simplifying
assumption that the euro area is a small open economy motivated by the fact that the ECB’s macroeconomic
projections are made conditional on assumptions regarding external developments. The development of the
two versions of the NAWM builds extensively on the work by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Adolfson,
Lase´en, Linde´ and Villani (2007), who estimated, respectively, a closed and a small-open economy model of
the euro area using Bayesian techniques, and the advances made in developing the International Monetary
Fund’s calibrated Global Economy Model (GEM; cf. Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti, 2004) and the Federal
Reserve Board’s calibrated open-economy model named SIGMA (cf. Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust, 2005).
5Note that models which explicitly take expectations into account, such as DSGE models, seem more
natural candidates for empirical studies of the Lucas critique than atheoretical time-series models, such as
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In conducting our examination of conditional forecasting with the NAWM, we start by
comparing the performance of the model’s unconditional forecasts to those obtained from
a Bayesian VAR and to diﬀerent na¨ıve forecasts. The comparison reveals that the NAWM
performs favourably relative to the Bayesian VAR and the random walk, in particular in
the case of real GDP growth and GDP inﬂation for horizons that extend beyond one year.
We then show that conditioning on a possibly large set of policy-relevant variables helps to
improve the NAWM’s forecasting performance over some horizons, albeit not systematically.
This is in line with our ﬁnding that the conditioning assumptions are modest in the sense of
Leeper and Zha, at least as long as the multivariate nature of the shock uncertainty is taken
into account. We ﬁnally study the probability of prediction events, such as the event that
real GDP growth is negative for three consecutive quarters over the prediction horizon.
In so doing, we identify a heightened probability of a recession in 2001. The recession
signal is broadly similar across information sets, even though it is more pronounced when
conditioning on (ex-post) foreign data.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
speciﬁcation of the NAWM, while Section 3 reports on our implementation of Bayesian
inference methods and on our estimation results. Section 4 compares the performance of
unconditional forecasts based on the NAWM against simple benchmarks. Section 5 examines
conditional versus unconditional forecasting with the NAWM and assesses the modesty of
the conditioning assumptions as well as prediction events. Section 6 concludes.
2. The New Area-Wide Model of the Euro Area
In this section, we outline the speciﬁcation of the New Area-Wide Model (NAWM).
Throughout, we maintain the simplifying assumption that the euro area is a small open
economy. Within the domestic (i.e., the euro area) economy, there are four types of eco-
nomic agents: households, ﬁrms, a ﬁscal authority, and a monetary authority. As regards
ﬁrms, we distinguish between producers of tradable diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and
producers of three non-tradable ﬁnal goods: a private consumption good, a private invest-
ment good, and a public consumption good. In addition, there are foreign intermediate-good
producers that sell their diﬀerentiated goods in domestic markets. International linkages
VARs, which do not distinguish between the intrinsic dynamics generated by the model structure and those
generated by expectations.
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arise from the trade of intermediate goods and international assets, allowing for limited
exchange-rate pass-through and imperfect risk sharing.
In the following, we outline the behaviour of the diﬀerent types of agents, formulate the
aggregate resource constraint and state the law of motion for the domestic (net) holdings
of foreign assets. In this context, we also deﬁne expressions for the trade balance and the
terms of trade and derive an expression for export demand. To the extent needed, foreign
variables and parameters are indexed with an asterisk, ‘∗’.
2.1. Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [ 0, 1 ], the instantaneous utility of which
depends on the level of consumption as well as hours worked. Each household accumulates
physical capital, the services of which it rents out to ﬁrms, and buys and sells domestic gov-
ernment bonds as well as internationally traded bonds. This enables households to smooth
their consumption proﬁle in response to shocks. The households supply diﬀerentiated labour
services to ﬁrms and act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive markets. As a con-
sequence, each household is committed to supply suﬃcient labour services to satisfy ﬁrms’
labour demand.
Preferences and Constraints: Each household h maximises its lifetime utility in a given
period t by choosing purchases of the consumption good, Ch,t, purchases of the investment
good, Ih,t, which determines next period’s physical capital stock, Kh,t+1, the intensity
with which the existing capital stock is utilised in production, uh,t and next period’s (net)
holdings of domestic government bonds and internationally traded foreign bonds, Bh,t+1
and B∗h,t+1, respectively, given the following lifetime utility function:
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
βk
(
Ct+k ln (Ch,t+k − κCt+k−1)−
Nt+k
1 + ζ
(Nh,t+k)
1+ζ
)]
, (1)
where β denotes the discount factor and ζ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply. The parameter κ measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption.
Thus, the utility of household h depends positively on the diﬀerence between the current
level of individual consumption, Ch,t, and the lagged economy-wide consumption level,
Ct−1, and negatively on the number of hours worked, Nh,t. We will refer to Ct and Nt as
consumption preference and labour-supply shocks, respectively.
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Household h faces the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + τCt )PC,t Ch,t + PI,t Ih,t (2)
+ (RPt Rt)
−1Bh,t+1 + ((1− ΓB∗(sB∗,t+1; RP ∗t ))R∗t )−1St B∗h,t+1 + Ξt +Φh,t
= (1− τNt − τWht ) Wh,t Nh,t + (1− τKt ) (RK,t uh,t − Γu(uh,t)PI,t)Kh,t
+ τKt δ PI,t Kh,t + (1− τDt )Dh,t − Tt +Bh,t + St B∗h,t,
where PC,t and PI,t are the prices of a unit of the private consumption good and the
investment good, respectively. Nh,t denotes the labour services provided to ﬁrms at wage
rate Wh,t; RK,t indicates the rental rate for the eﬀective capital services rented to ﬁrms,
uh,t Kh,t, and Dh,t are the dividends paid by the household-owned ﬁrms. Rt and R∗t denote
the respective risk-less returns on domestic government bonds and internationally traded
foreign bonds. The latter are denominated in foreign currency and, thus, their domestic
value depends on the nominal exchange rate St (expressed in terms of units of home currency
per unit of foreign currency).
As regards the provision of eﬀective capital services, varying the intensity of utilising the
physical capital stock, uh,t, is subject to a proportional cost Γu(uh,t) which is assumed to
take the following form:
Γu(uh,t) = γu,1 (uh,t − 1) + γu,22 (uh,t − 1)
2 (3)
with γu,1, γu,2 > 0.
The eﬀective return on the risk-less domestic bonds depends on a ﬁnancial intermediation
premium, represented by the exogenous “risk” premium shock RPt , which drives a wedge
between the interest rate controlled by the monetary authority and the return required
by the household.6 Similarly, when taking a position in the international bond market, the
household encounters an external ﬁnancial intermediation premium ΓB∗(sB∗,t+1; RP
∗
t ) which
depends on the economy-wide (net) holdings of internally traded foreign bonds expressed
in domestic currency relative to domestic nominal output, sB∗,t+1 = St B∗t+1/PY,tYt, and
takes the form:
ΓB∗(sB∗,t+1; RP
∗
t ) = γB∗
(
RP
∗
t exp
(
St B
∗
t+1
PY,t Yt
)
− 1
)
(4)
with γB∗ < 0.7
6See Smets and Wouters (2007) for further discussion.
7Note that we have used current nominal output and the current exchange rate to scale B∗t+1, because
the latter is a predetermined variable.
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Here, the shock RP
∗
t represents the exogenous component of the external intermediation
premium and will be referred to as external risk premium shock. This speciﬁcation implies
that, in the steady state, households have no incentive to hold foreign bonds and the econ-
omy’s net foreign asset position is zero.8 The incurred intermediation premium is rebated
in a lump-sum manner, being indicated by Ξt.
The ﬁscal authority absorbs part of the household’s gross income to ﬁnance its expen-
diture. In this context, τCt denotes the consumption tax rate levied on the household’s
consumption purchases; and τNt , τ
K
t and τ
D
t are the tax rates levied on the diﬀerent sources
of the household’s income: wage income Wh,t Nh,t, rental capital income RK,t Kh,t and div-
idend income Dh,t.9 Here, for simplicity, we assume that the utilisation cost of physical
capital as well as physical capital depreciation, δ PI,t Kh,t, are exempted from taxation.
τWht is the additional pay-roll tax rate levied on wage income (representing the household’s
contribution to social security). The term Tt denotes lump-sum taxes.
Finally, it is assumed that each household h holds state-contingent securities, Φh,t. These
securities are traded amongst households and provide insurance against household-speciﬁc
wage-income risk. This guarantees that the marginal utility of consumption out of wage
income is identical across households.10 As a result, all households will choose identical
allocations in equilibrium.11
The capital stock owned by household h evolves according to the following capital accu-
mulation equation:
Kh,t+1 = (1− δ)Kh,t + It (1− ΓI(Ih,t/Ih,t−1)) Ih,t, (5)
where δ is the depreciation rate, ΓI(Ih,t/Ih,t−1) represents a generalised adjustment cost
function formulated in terms of the (gross) rate of change in investment, Ih,t/Ih,t−1, and It
denotes an investment-speciﬁc technology shock. The adjustment cost function is assumed
to take the following form:
ΓI(Ih,t/Ih,t−1) =
γI
2
(
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
− gz
)2
(6)
with γI > 0. The term gz denotes the rate of productivity growth in the economy’s non-
stochastic steady state.
8See Benigno (2001) for further discussion.
9For simplicity, it is assumed that dividends are taxed at the household level.
10The existence of state-contingent securities is assumed for analytical convenience and renders the model
tractable under staggered wage setting when households are supplying diﬀerentiated labour services.
11This in turn guarantees that Ci,t = CI,t in equilibrium.
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Choice of Allocations: Deﬁning as Λh,t/PC,t and Λh,t Qh,t the Lagrange multipliers associ-
ated with the budget constraint (2) and the capital accumulation equation (5), respectively,
the ﬁrst-order conditions for maximising the household’s lifetime utility function (1) with
respect to Ch,t, Ih,t, Kh,t+1, uh,t, Bh,t+1 and B∗h,t+1 are given by:
Λh,t = Ct
(Ch,t − κCt−1)−1
1 + τCt
, (7)
PI,t
PC,t
= Qh,t It
(
1− ΓI(Ih,t/Ih,t−1)− Γ′I(Ih,t/Ih,t−1)
Ih,t
Ih,t−1
)
(8)
+β Et
[
Λh,t+1
Λh,t
Qh,t+1 
I
t+1 Γ
′
I(Ih,t+1/Ih,t)
I2h,t+1
I2h,t
]
,
Qh,t = β Et
[
Λh,t+1
Λh,t
(
(1− δ)Qh,t+1 (9)
+ (1− τKt+1)
RK,t+1
PC,t+1
uh,t+1 +
(
τKt+1 δ − (1− τKt+1) Γu(uh,t+1)
) PI,t+1
PC,t+1
)]
,
RK,t = Γ′u(uh,t)PI,t, (10)
β RPt Rt Et
[
Λh,t+1
Λh,t
PC,t
PC,t+1
]
= 1, (11)
β (1− ΓB∗(sB∗,t+1; RP ∗t ))R∗t Et
[
Λh,t+1
Λh,t
PC,t
PC,t+1
St+1
St
]
= 1. (12)
Here, Λh,t represents the shadow price of a unit of the consumption good; that is, the
marginal utility of consumption out of income. Similarly, Qh,t measures the shadow price
of a unit of the investment good; that is, Tobin’s Q.12
In equilibrium, with all households choosing identical allocations, the combination of the
ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to the holdings of domestic and internationally traded
bonds, (11) and (12), yields a risk-adjusted uncovered-interest-parity condition, reﬂecting
the assumption that the return on internationally traded bonds is subject to an external
ﬁnancial intermediation premium.
Wage Setting: Each household h supplies its diﬀerentiated labour services Nh,t in monop-
olistically competitive markets. There is sluggish wage adjustment due to staggered wage
contracts a` la Calvo (1983). Accordingly, household h receives permission to optimally reset
its nominal wage contract Wh,t in a given period t with probability 1− ξW .
12Notice that the domestic risk premium shock, RPt , aﬀects investment via Tobin’s Q and helps to
explain the co-movement of consumption and investment observed in the data. In contrast, the consumption
preference shock, Ct , moves consumption and investment in opposite directions.
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All households that receive permission to reset their wage contracts in a given period t
choose the same wage rate W˜t = W˜h,t. Those households which do not receive permission
are allowed to adjust their wage contracts according to the following scheme:
Wh,t = gz,t Π
†
C,t Wh,t−1, (13)
where gz,t = zt/zt−1, with zt representing trend labour productivity (see below), and Π
†
C,t =
Π
χ
W
C,t−1Π¯
1−χ
W
t ; that is, the nominal wage contracts are adjusted one-to-one with the (gross)
rate of productivity growth and indexed to a geometric average of past (gross) consumer
price inﬂation, ΠC,t−1 = PC,t−1/PC,t−2, and the monetary authority’s possibly time-varying
(gross) inﬂation objective, Π¯t. Here, χW is an indexation parameter.
Each household h receiving permission to reset its wage contract in period t maximises
its lifetime utility function (1) subject to its budget constraint (2), the demand for its
diﬀerentiated labour services (the formal derivation of which we postpone until we consider
the ﬁrms’ problem in Section 2.2 below) and the wage-indexation scheme (13).
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition characterising the households’ opti-
mal wage-setting decision:
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(ξ
W
β)k
(
Λt+k (1− τNt+k − τWht+k) gz;t,t+k
Π†C;t,t+k
ΠC;t,t+k
W˜t
PC,t
(14)
−ϕWt+k Nt+k (Nh,t+k)ζ
)
Nh,t+k
]
= 0,
where Λt+k denotes the marginal utility out of income (equal across all households),
gz;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1 gz,t+s, Π
†
C;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1 Π
χ
W
C,t+s−1Π¯
1−χ
W
t+s and ΠC;t,t+k =
∏k
s=1 ΠC,t+s−1.
This expression states that in those labour markets in which wage contracts are re-
optimised, the latter are set so as to equate the households’ discounted sum of expected
after-tax marginal revenues, expressed in consumption-based utility terms, Λt+k, to the dis-
counted sum of expected marginal cost, expressed in terms of marginal disutility of labour,
∆h,t+k = −N ζh,t+k. In the absence of wage staggering (ξW = 0), the factor ϕWt represents
a possibly time-varying markup of the real after-tax wage charged over the households’
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure,
(1− τNt − τWht )
W˜t
PC,t
= −ϕWt Nt
∆t
Λt
, (15)
reﬂecting the existence of monopoly power on the part of the households.13
13Note that, in this case, also the marginal disutility is equal across households; that is ∆t = ∆h,t.
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Aggregate Wage Dynamics: With the continuum of households setting the wage contracts
for their diﬀerentiated labour services according to equation (13) and equation (14), respec-
tively, the aggregate wage index Wt evolves according to
Wt =
(
ξ
W
(
gz,t Π
†
C,tWt−1
) 1
1−ϕWt + (1− ξ
W
)
(
W˜t
) 1
1−ϕWt
)1−ϕWt
. (16)
2.2. Firms
There are two types of monopolistically competitive intermediate-good ﬁrms: A continuum
of domestic intermediate-good ﬁrms indexed by f ∈ [ 0, 1 ] that produce diﬀerentiated out-
puts that are sold domestically or abroad, and a continuum of foreign intermediate-good
ﬁrms indexed by f∗ ∈ [ 0, 1 ] that produce diﬀerentiated outputs that are sold in domestic
markets. In addition there is a set of three representative domestic ﬁrms, which combine the
purchases of domestically-produced intermediate goods with purchases of imported inter-
mediate goods into three distinct non-tradable ﬁnal goods, namely a private consumption
good, a private investment good and a public consumption good.
2.2.1. Domestic Intermediate-Good Firms
Technology: Each domestic intermediate-good ﬁrm f produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate
good Yf,t with an increasing-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that is subject to
ﬁxed costs of production, zt ψ,
Yf,t = max
[
εt (Ksf,t)
α (zt Nf,t)1−α − zt ψ, 0
]
, (17)
utilising as inputs homogenous capital services, Ksf,t, that are rent from households in fully
competitive markets, and an index of diﬀerentiated labour services, Nf,t, which combines
household-speciﬁc varieties of labour that are supplied in monopolistically competitive mar-
kets,
Nf,t =
(∫ 1
0
(
Nhf,t
) 1
ϕWt dh
)ϕWt
, (18)
where the possibly time-varying parameter ϕWt > 1 is inversely related to the intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated labour services supplied by the
households, ηt = ϕWt /(ϕ
W
t − 1) > 1.14
14As shown above, the parameter ϕWt has a natural interpretation as a markup in the household-speciﬁc
labour market. In contrast, the exposition in Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2007) focuses on the intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution η which is assumed to be time invariant.
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The variable εt represents a transitory technology shock that aﬀects total-factor produc-
tivity, while the variable zt denotes a permanent technology shock shifting the productivity
of labour and introducing a unit root in the ﬁrm’s output. Both shocks, and the ﬁxed cost
of production, are assumed to be identical across ﬁrms. The ﬁxed cost is scaled by the
permanent technology shock to guarantee that the ﬁxed cost as a fraction of output do not
vanish as output grows.15
Capital and Labour Inputs: Taking the rental cost of capital RK,t and the aggregate wage
index Wt as given, the intermediate-good ﬁrm’s optimal demand for capital and labour
services must solve the problem of minimising total input cost RK,t Kf,t +(1+ τ
Wf
t )Wt Nf,t
subject to the technology constraint (17). Here, τWft denotes the payroll tax rate levied on
wage payments (representing the ﬁrms’ contribution to social security).
Deﬁning as MCf,t the Lagrange multiplier associated with the technology constraint (17),
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrms’ cost minimisation problem with respect to capital
and labour inputs are given, respectively, by
α
Yf,t + zt ψ
Ksf,t
MCf,t = RK,t, (19)
(1− α) Yf,t + ztψ
Nf,t
MCf,t = (1 + τ
Wf
t )Wt, (20)
or, more compactly,
α
1− α
Nf,t
Ksf,t
=
RK,t
(1 + τWft )Wt
. (21)
Here, the Lagrange multiplier MCf,t measures the shadow price of varying the use of
capital and labour services; that is, nominal marginal cost. We note that, since all ﬁrms f
face the same input prices and since they all have access to the same production technology,
nominal marginal cost MCf,t are identical across ﬁrms; that is, MCf,t = MCt with
MCt =
1
εt z
1−α
t α
α(1− α)1−α (RK,t)
α((1 + τWft )Wt)
1−α. (22)
With nominal wage contracts for diﬀerentiated labour services h being set in monopo-
listically competitive markets, ﬁrm f takes Wh,t as given and chooses the optimal input
of each labour variety h by minimising the total wage-related labour cost
∫ 1
0 Wh,t N
h
f,tdh,
subject to the aggregation constraint (18).
15The parameter ψ will be chosen to ensure zero proﬁts in steady state. This in turn guarantees that
there is no incentive for other ﬁrms to enter the market in the long run.
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The resulting demand for labour variety h is a function of the household-speciﬁc wage
rate Wh,t relative to the aggregate wage index Wt:
Nhf,t =
(
Wh,t
Wt
)− ϕWt
ϕWt −1 Nf,t (23)
with −ϕWt /(ϕWt − 1) representing the wage elasticity of labour demand.
The wage index Wt can be obtained by substituting the labour index (18) into the labour
demand schedule (23) and then integrating over the unit interval of households:
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
W
1
1−ϕWt
h,t dh
)1−ϕWt
. (24)
Aggregating over the continuum of ﬁrms f , we obtain the following aggregate demand
for the labour services of a given household h:
Nht =
∫ 1
0
Nhf,t df =
(
Wh,t
Wt
)− ϕWt
ϕWt −1 Nt. (25)
Price Setting: Each ﬁrm f sells its diﬀerentiated output Yf,t in both domestic and foreign
markets under monopolistic competition. We assume that the ﬁrm charges diﬀerent prices
at home and abroad, setting prices in domestic (that is, producer) currency. In both
markets, there is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price contracts a` la Calvo
(1983). Accordingly, ﬁrm f receives permission to optimally reset prices in a given period
t either with probability 1− ξ
H
or with probability 1− ξ
X
, depending on whether the ﬁrm
sells its diﬀerentiated output in the domestic or the foreign market.
Deﬁning as PH,f,t the domestic price of good f and as PX,f,t its foreign price, all ﬁrms
that receive permission to reset their price contracts in a given period t choose the same
price P˜H,t = P˜H,f,t and P˜X,t = P˜X,f,t, depending on the market of destination. Those ﬁrms
which do not receive permission are allowed to adjust their prices according to the following
schemes:
PH,f,t = Π
χ
H
H,t−1Π¯
1−χ
H
t PH,f,t−1, (26)
PX,f,t = Π
χ
X
X,t−1(Π¯
∗
t )
1−χ
HPX,f,t−1, (27)
that is, the price contracts are indexed to a geometric average of past (gross) intermediate-
good inﬂation, ΠH,t−1 = PH,t−1/PH,t−2 and ΠX,t−1 = PX,t−1/PX,t−2, and possibly time-
varying (gross) inﬂation objectives of the domestic and foreign monetary authorities, Π¯t
and Π¯∗t , where χH and χX are indexation parameters.
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Each ﬁrm f receiving permission to optimally reset its domestic and/or foreign price in
period t maximises the discounted sum of its expected nominal proﬁts,
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
Λt,t+k
(
ξk
H
DH,f,t+k + ξkX DX,f,t+k
)]
, (28)
subject to the price-indexation schemes (26) and (27) and taking as given domestic and
foreign demand for its diﬀerentiated output, Hf,t and Xf,t (to be derived below), where the
stochastic discount factor Λt,t+k can be obtained from the consumption Euler equation of
the households, and
DH,f,t = PH,f,t Hf,t −MCt Hf,t, (29)
DX,f,t = PX,f,t Xf,t −MCt Xf,t (30)
are period-t nominal proﬁts (net of ﬁxed cost) yielded in the domestic and foreign markets,
respectively, which are distributed as dividends to the households.16 Hence, we obtain
the following ﬁrst-order condition characterising the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing decision for its
output sold in the domestic market:
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
ξkH Λt,t+k
(
Π†H,t,t+k P˜H,t − ϕHt+k MCt+k
)
Hf,t+k
]
= 0, (31)
where we have substituted the indexation scheme (26), noting that PH,f,t+k = Π
†
H,t,t+kP˜H,t
with Π†H,t,t+k =
∏k
s=1 Π
χ
H
H,t+s−1Π¯
1−χ
H
t+s .
This expression states that in those intermediate-good markets in which price contracts
are re-optimised, the latter are set so as to equate the ﬁrms’ discounted sum of expected
revenues to the discounted sum of expected marginal cost. In the absence of price staggering
(ξ
H
= 0), the factor ϕHt represents a possibly time-varying markup of the price charged in
domestic markets over nominal marginal cost, reﬂecting the degree of monopoly power on
the part of the intermediate-good ﬁrms.17
Similarly, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition characterising the ﬁrm’s optimal
pricing decision for its output sold in the foreign market:
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
ξkX Λt,t+k
(
Π†X,t,t+k P˜X,t − ϕXt+k MCt+k
)
Xf,t+k
]
= 0, (32)
16Note that we have made use of the ﬁrst-order conditions (9) and (20) to derive the expressions for
nominal proﬁts.
17The markup depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated goods
supplied by the intermediate-good ﬁrms to the domestic ﬁnal-good ﬁrms, which in turn determines the
ﬁnal-good ﬁrms’ price elasticity of demand for the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods.
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where we have substituted the indexation scheme (27), noting that PX,f,t+k = Π
†
X,t,t+kP˜X,t
with Π†X,t,t+k =
∏k
s=1 Π
χ
X
X,t+s−1Π¯
1−χ
X , assuming, for simplicity, that the foreign inﬂation
objective is time invariant and equal to the domestic long-run inﬂation objective, Π¯∗ = Π¯.
Aggregate Price Dynamics: With the continuum of intermediate-good ﬁrms f setting the
price contracts for their diﬀerentiated products sold domestically, PH,f,t, according to equa-
tion (26) and equation (31), respectively, the aggregate price index PH,t evolves according
to
PH,t =
(
(1− ξ
H
)(P˜H,t)
1
1−ϕHt + ξ
H
(
Π
χ
H
H,t−1Π¯
1−χ
H
t PH,t−1
) 1
1−ϕHt
)1−ϕHt
. (33)
A similar relationship holds for the aggregate index of price contracts set for the diﬀer-
entiated products sold abroad, PX,t, with
PX,t =
(
(1− ξ
X
)(P˜X,t)
1
1−ϕXt + ξ
X
(
Π
χ
X
X,t−1Π¯
1−χ
XPX,t−1
) 1
1−ϕXt
)1−ϕXt
. (34)
2.2.2. Foreign Intermediate-Good Firms
Each foreign intermediate-good ﬁrm f∗ sells its diﬀerentiated good Y ∗f∗,t domestically under
monopolistic competition, setting the price in domestic (that is, local) currency, as in Betts
and Devereux (1996). Again, there is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price
contracts a` la Calvo. Accordingly, the foreign exporter receives permission to optimally
reset its price in a given period t with probability 1 − ξ∗ and has access to the following
indexation scheme with parameter χ∗:
PIM,f∗,t = Π
χ∗
IM,t−1Π¯
1−χ∗
t PIM,f∗,t−1, (35)
where PIM,f∗,t = P ∗X,f∗,t and ΠIM,t−1 = PIM,t−1/PIM,t−2 with PIM,t = P
∗
X,t. Here, we have
utilised the fact that, with foreign intermediate-good ﬁrms setting prices in domestic cur-
rency, the price of the intermediate good imported from abroad (the import price index of
the home country) is equal to the price charged by the foreign exporter in the home country
(the export price index of the foreign country).
Each foreign exporter f∗ receiving permission to optimally reset its price in period t
maximises the discounted sum of its expected nominal proﬁts,
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(ξ∗)k Λ∗t,t+k D
∗
f∗,t+k
]
, (36)
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subject to the price-indexation scheme and the domestic (import) demand for its diﬀeren-
tiated output, IMf∗,t = X∗f∗ (to be derived below), where
D∗f∗,t = PIM,f∗,t IMf∗,t −MC∗t IMf∗,t (37)
with MC∗t = St P ∗Y,t representing the foreign exporter’s nominal marginal cost.
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition characterising the foreign exporter’s
optimal pricing decision for its output sold in the domestic market:
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(ξ∗)k Λ∗t,t+k
(
Π†IM,t,t+k P˜IM,t − ϕ∗t+k MC∗t+k
)
IMf∗,t+k
]
= 0, (38)
where we have substituted the indexation scheme (35), noting that PIM,f∗,t+k = Π
†
IM,t,t+k
P˜IM,t with Π
†
IM,t,t+k =
∏k
s=1 Π
χ∗
IM,t+s−1Π¯
1−χ∗
t+s .
The associated aggregate index of price contracts for the diﬀerentiated products sold in
domestic markets, PIM,t, evolves according to
PIM,t =
(
(1− ξ∗)(P˜IM,t)
1
1−ϕ∗t + ξ∗
(
Πχ
∗
IM,t−1Π¯
1−χ∗
t PIM,t−1
) 1
1−ϕ∗t
)1−ϕ∗t
. (39)
2.2.3. Final-Good Firms
There are three diﬀerent types of ﬁnal-good ﬁrms which combine the purchases of the
domestically-produced intermediate goods with purchases of the imported intermediate
goods into three distinct non-tradable ﬁnal goods, namely a private consumption good,
QCt , a private investment good, Q
I
t , and a public consumption good, Q
G
t .
The representative ﬁrm producing the non-tradable ﬁnal private consumption good, QCt ,
combines purchases of a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, HCt , with
purchases of a bundle of imported foreign intermediate goods, IMCt , using a constant-
returns-to-scale CES technology,
QCt =
(
ν
1
µC
C
(
HCt
)1− 1
µC + (1− ν
C
)
1
µC
(
(1− ΓIMC (IMCt /QCt ; IMt )) IMCt
)1− 1
µC
) µC
µC−1
(40)
where µ
C
> 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the distinct
bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, while the parameter ν
C
measures the
home bias in the production of the consumption good.
Notice that the ﬁnal-good ﬁrm incurs a cost ΓIMC (IMCt /Q
C
t ; 
IM
t ) when varying the use
of the bundle of imported goods in producing the consumption good,
ΓIMC (IM
C
t /Q
C
t ; 
IM
t ) =
γCIM
2
(
IMt
IMCt /Q
C
t
IMCt−1/QCt−1
− 1
)2
(41)
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with γCIM > 0. As a result, the import share is relatively unresponsive in the short run to
changes in the relative price of the bundle of imported goods, while the level of imports is
permitted to jump in response to changes in overall demand.18 We will refer to IMt as an
import demand shock.
Deﬁning as HCf,t and IM
C
f∗,t the use of the diﬀerentiated output produced by the domestic
intermediate-good ﬁrm f and the diﬀerentiated output supplied by the foreign exporter f∗,
respectively, we have
HCt =
(∫ 1
0
(
HCf,t
) 1
ϕHt df
)ϕHt
, (42)
IMCt =
(∫ 1
0
(
IMCf∗,t
) 1
ϕ∗t df∗
)ϕ∗t
, (43)
where the possibly time-varying parameters ϕHt , ϕ
∗
t > 1 are inversely related to the in-
tratemporal elasticities of substitution between the diﬀerentiated outputs supplied by the
domestic ﬁrms and the foreign exporters, respectively, with θHt = ϕ
H
t /(ϕ
H
t − 1) > 1 and
θ∗t = ϕ∗t /(ϕ∗t − 1) > 1.19
With nominal prices for the diﬀerentiated goods f and f∗ being set in monopolistically
competitive markets, the ﬁnal-good ﬁrm takes their prices PH,f,t and PIM,f∗,t as given and
chooses the optimal use of the diﬀerentiated goods f and f∗ by minimising the expenditure
for the bundles of diﬀerentiated goods,
∫ 1
0 PH,f,t H
C
f,t df and
∫ 1
0 PIM,f∗,t IM
C
f∗,t df
∗, subject to
the aggregation constraints (42) and (43). This yields the following demand functions for
the diﬀerentiated goods f and f∗:
HCf,t =
(
PH,f,t
PH,t
)− ϕHt
ϕHt −1 HCt , (44)
IMCf∗,t =
(
PIM,f∗,t
PIM,t
)− ϕ∗t
ϕ∗t−1
IMCt , (45)
where
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
(PH,f,t)
1
1−ϕHt df
)1−ϕHt
, (46)
PIM,t =
(∫ 1
0
(PIM,f∗,t)
1
1−ϕ∗t df∗
)1−ϕ∗t
(47)
18While our treatment of the adjustment cost as being external to the ﬁrm would formally involve
assuming the existence of a large number of ﬁrms with appropriate changes in notation (see, e.g., Bayoumi,
Laxton and Pesenti, 2004), we abstract from these changes for ease of exposition.
19The parameters ϕHt and ϕ
∗
t have a natural interpretation as markups in the markets for domestic and
imported intermediate goods. In contrast, the exposition in Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2007) focuses
on the intratemporal elasticities of substitution θH , θ∗ which are assumed to be time invariant.
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are the aggregate price indexes for the bundles of domestic and imported intermediate
goods, respectively.
Next, taking the price indexes PH,t and PIM,t as given, the consumption-good ﬁrm chooses
the combination of the domestic and foreign intermediate-good bundles HCt and IM
C
t that
minimises PH,t HCt + PIM,t IM
C
t subject to aggregation constraint (40). This yields the
following demand functions for the intermediate-good bundles:
HCt = νC
(
PH,t
PC,t
)−µ
C
QCt , (48)
IMCt = (1− νC)
(
PIM,t
PC,t Γ
†
IMC
(IMCt /Q
C
t ; 
IM
t )
)−µ
C QCt
1− ΓIMC (IMCt /QCt ; IMt )
, (49)
where
PC,t =
⎛⎝ν
C
(PH,t)
1−µ
C + (1− ν
C
)
(
PIM,t
Γ†
IMC
(IMCt /Q
C
t ; 
IM
t )
)1−µ
C
⎞⎠ 11−µC (50)
is the price of a unit of the private consumption good and
Γ†
IMC
(IMCt /Q
C
t ; 
IM
t ) = 1− ΓIMC (IMCt /QCt ; IMt )− Γ′IMC (IMCt /QCt ; IMt ) IMCt . (51)
The representative ﬁrm producing the non-tradable ﬁnal private investment good, QIt , is
modelled in an analogous manner. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm combines its purchase of a bundle of
domestically-produced intermediate goods, HIt , with the purchase of a bundle of imported
foreign intermediate goods, IM It , using a constant-returns-to-scale CES technology,
QIt =
(
ν
1
µI
I
(
HIt
)1− 1
µI + (1− ν
I
)
1
µI
(
(1− ΓIMI (IM It /QIt ; IMt )) IM It
)1− 1
µI
) µI
µI−1
, (52)
where µ
I
> 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the distinct bun-
dles of domestic and foreign intermediate inputs, while the possibly time-varying parameter
ν
I,t
measures the home bias in the production of the investment good.
All other variables related to the production of the investment good—import adjustment
cost, ΓIMI (IM It /Q
I
t ; 
IM
t ); the optimal demand for ﬁrm-speciﬁc and bundled domestic and
foreign intermediate goods, HIf,t, H
I
t and IM
I
f∗,t, IM
I
t , respectively; as well as the price of
a unit of the investment good, PI,t—are deﬁned or derived in a manner analogous to that
for the consumption good.20
20Notice that even in the absence of import adjustment cost, the prices of the consumption and investment
goods may diﬀer due to diﬀerences in the import content.
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In contrast, the non-tradable ﬁnal public consumption good QGt is assumed to be a
composite made only of domestic intermediate goods; that is, QGt = H
G
t with
HGt =
(∫ 1
0
(
HGf,t
) 1
ϕHt df
)ϕHt
. (53)
Hence, the optimal demand for each domestic intermediate good f is given by
HGf,t =
(
PH,f,t
PH,t
)− ϕHt
ϕHt −1 HGt , (54)
and the price of a unit of the public consumption good is PG,t = PH,t.
Aggregating across the three ﬁnal-good ﬁrms, we obtain the following demand for do-
mestic and foreign intermediate goods f and f∗, respectively:
Hf,t = HCf,t +H
I
f,t +H
G
f,t =
(
PH,f,t
PH,t
)− ϕHt
ϕHt −1 Ht, (55)
IMf∗,t = IMCf∗,t + IM
I
f∗,t =
(
PIM,f∗,t
PIM,t
)− ϕ∗t
ϕ∗t−1
IMt, (56)
where Ht = HCt +H
I
t +H
G
t and IMt = IM
C
t + IM
I
t .
2.3. Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
2.3.1. Fiscal Authority
The ﬁscal authority purchases the ﬁnal public consumption good, Gt, issues bonds to re-
ﬁnance its outstanding debt, Bt, and raises both distortionary and lump-sum taxes. The
ﬁscal authority’s period-by-period budget constraint then has the following form:
PG,t Gt +Bt = τCt PC,t Ct + (τ
N
t + τ
Wh
t )
∫ 1
0
Wh,t Nh,t dh+ τ
Wf
t Wt Nt (57)
+ τKt (RK,t ut − (Γu(ut) + δ)PI,t )Kt + τDt Dt + Tt +R−1t Bt+1,
where all quantities are expressed in economy-wide terms, except for the households’ labour
services and wages, Nh,t and Wh,t, which are diﬀerentiated across households.
The purchases of the public consumption good Gt are assumed to evolve exogenously.
As regards the evolution of the ﬁscal authority’s outstanding debt Bt, we note that our
model—in its current simpliﬁed speciﬁcation—features “Ricardian equivalence”. Hence,
the particular time path of debt is irrelevant for the households’ choice of allocations. For
this reason and without loss of generality, we assume that lump-sum taxes close the ﬁscal
authority’s budget constraint each period. Finally, all distortionary tax rates τZt with
Z = C, D, K, N, Wh and Wf are assumed to be set exogenously.
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2.3.2. Monetary Authority
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a simple log-linear
interest-rate rule,
r̂t = φR r̂t−1 + (1− φR)
(̂¯πt + φΠ (π̂C,t−1 − ̂¯πt)+ φY ŷt) (58)
+φ∆Π (π̂C,t − π̂C,t−1) + φ∆Y (ŷt − ŷt−1) + ηRt ,
where r̂t = log(Rt/R) is the logarithmic deviation of the (gross) nominal interest rate from
its steady-state value. Similarly, π̂C,t = log(ΠC,t/Π¯) denotes the logarithmic deviation of
(gross) quarter-on-quarter consumer price inﬂation ΠC,t = PC,t/PC,t−1 from the monetary
authority’s long-run inﬂation objective Π¯, while ̂¯πt = log(Π¯t/Π¯) represents the logarithmic
deviation of the monetary authority’s possibly time-varying inﬂation objective from its long-
run value. Finally, ŷt =̂Yt/zt is the logarithmic deviation of aggregate output from trend
output implied by the assumed unit-root technology (that is, the output gap), while ηRt is
a shock to the nominal interest rate.
2.4. Aggregate Resource Constraint and Net Foreign Assets
The model is closed by formulating the aggregate resource constraint and stating the law
of motion for the domestic net foreign assets. In this context, it is convenient to deﬁne the
trade balance and the terms of trade and to derive an expression for export demand.
2.4.1. Aggregate Resource Constraint
Imposing market-clearing conditions (see Christoﬀel, Coenen and Warne (2007) for details)
implies the following aggregate resource constraint:
PY,t Yt = PH,t Ht + PX,t Xt
= PC,t Ct + PI,t (It + Γu(ut)Kt) + PG,t Gt + PX,t Xt (59)
−PIM,t
(
IMCt
1− ΓIMC (IMCt /QCt ; IMt )
Γ†
IMC
(IMCt /Q
C
t ; 
IM
t )
+ IM It
1− ΓIMI (IM It /QIt ; IMt )
Γ†
IMI
(IM It /Q
I
t ; 
IM
t )
)
.
2.4.2. Net Foreign Assets
The domestic holdings of foreign bonds (that is, the domestic economy’s net foreign assets,
denominated in foreign currency) evolve according to
(R∗t )
−1B∗t+1 = B
∗
t +
TBt
St
, (60)
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where
TBt = PX,t Xt − PIM,t IMt (61)
is the domestic economy’s trade balance, which is conveniently expressed as a share
of domestic output, sTB,t = TBt/PY,tYt (like the net foreign assets with sB∗,t+1 =
St B
∗
t+1/PY,tYt).
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The terms of trade (deﬁned as the domestic price of imports relative to the price of
exports in domestic currency) are given by:
ToTt =
PIM,t
PX,t
. (62)
Finally, the volume of exports Xt is determined by a demand equation similar in structure
to the domestic import equation,
Xt = ν∗t
(
St PX,t
P c,∗X,t Γ
†
X(Xt/Y
d,∗
t ; 
X
t )
)−µ∗
Y d,∗t
1− ΓX(Xt/Y d,∗t ; Xt )
,
(63)
where ν∗t is a possibly time-varying export share, which captures the foreign preference for
domestic intermediate goods. The variable P c,∗X,t denotes the price of foreign competitors
of domestic intermediate-good producers on the export side, Y d,∗t is a measure of foreign
demand, and ΓX(Xt/Y
d,∗
t ; 
X
t ) is an adjustment cost function given by
ΓX(Xt/Y
d,∗
t ; 
X
t ) =
γ∗
2
(
Xt
Xt/Y
d,∗
t
Xt−1/Y
d,∗
t−1
− 1
)2
(64)
and
Γ†X(Xt/Y
d,∗
t ; 
X
t ) = 1− ΓX(Xt/Y d,∗t ; Xt )− Γ′X(Xt/Y d,∗t ; Xt )Xt. (65)
3. Bayesian Estimation
We adopt the empirical approach outlined in Smets and Wouters (2003) and estimate our
version of the NAWM employing Bayesian inference methods. This involves obtaining
the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters based on its log-linear state-space
representation using the Kalman ﬁlter.22, 23
21Notice that the existence of a ﬁnancial intermediation premium guarantees that, in the non-stochastic
steady state, domestic holdings of internationally traded bonds are zero.
22For details on the derivation of the log-linear representation of the NAWM, see Christoﬀel and
Coenen (2006).
23For all computations, we use YADA, a Matlab programme for Bayesian estimation and evaluation of
DSGE models (cf. Warne, 2007).
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In the following we brieﬂy sketch the adopted approach and describe the data and the
prior distributions used in its implementation. In this context, we also provide information
on the structural shocks that we consider in the estimation and describe the calibration of
those parameters that we keep ﬁxed. We then present our estimation results.
3.1. Methodology
Employing Bayesian inference methods allows formalising the use of prior information ob-
tained from earlier studies at both the micro and macro level in estimating the parameters
of a possibly complex DSGE model. This seems particularly appealing in situations where
the sample period of the data is relatively short, as is the case for the euro area. From a
practical perspective, Bayesian inference may also help to alleviate the inherent numerical
diﬃculties associated with solving the highly non-linear estimation problem.
Formally, let p(θ|m) denote the prior distribution of the vector θ ∈ Θ with structural
parameters for some model m ∈ M, and let p(YT |θ,m) denote the likelihood function for
the observed data, YT = { y1, . . . , yT }, conditional on parameter vector θ and model m.
The joint posterior distribution of the parameter vector θ for model m is then obtained by
combining the likelihood function for YT and the prior distribution of θ,
p(θ|YT ,m) ∝ p(YT |θ,m) p(θ|m),
where “∝” indicates proportionality.24
The posterior distribution is typically characterised by measures of central location, such
as the mode or the mean, measures of dispersion, such as the standard deviation, or selected
percentiles.
As discussed in Geweke (1999), Bayesian inference also provides a framework for compar-
ing alternative and potentially misspeciﬁed models on the basis of their marginal likelihood.
For a given model m the latter is obtained by integrating out the parameter vector θ,
p(YT |m) =
∫
θ∈Θ
p(YT |θ,m) p(θ|m) dθ.
Thus, the marginal likelihood gives an indication of the overall likelihood of a model con-
ditional on the observed data.
24As in Smets and Wouters (2003), and following Schorfheide (2000), we adopt a Monte-Carlo Markov-
Chain (MCMC) sampling algorithm to determine the joint posterior distribution of the parameter vector θ.
More speciﬁcally, we rely on the Random-Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RWMH) algorithm to obtain a large
number of random draws from the posterior distribution of θ. The mode and a modiﬁed Hessian of the
posterior distribution, the latter evaluated at the mode, are used to determine the initial proposal density
for the RWMH algorithm. The posterior mode and the Hessian matrix are computed by standard numerical
optimisation routines, namely Christopher Sims’ optimiser csminwel.
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3.2. Data and Shocks
3.2.1. Data
In estimating the NAWM, we use data on 17 key macroeconomic times series:
• real GDP (Y ) • total employment (E)
• private consumption (C) • compensation of employees (W )
• total investment (I) • nominal interest rate (R)
• government consumption (G) • nominal eﬀective exchange rate (S)
• extra-euro area exports (X) • foreign competitors’ prices (P c,∗X )†
• extra-euro area imports (IM) • foreign demand (Y d,∗)†
• GDP deﬂator (PY ) • foreign GDP deﬂator (P ∗Y )†
• consumption deﬂator (PC) • foreign nominal interest rate (R∗)†
• extra import deﬂator (PIM )
All time series are taken from an updated version of the AWM database (see Fagan,
Henry and Mestre, 2001), except for the time series for extra-euro area trade data (both
volumes and prices) which stem from internal ECB sources. The sample period ranges from
1985Q1 to 2005Q4 (using the period 1980Q2 to 1984Q4 as training sample). The times series
marked with a dagger (‘†’) are modelled using a structural VAR, the estimated parameters
of which are kept ﬁxed throughout the estimation. Similarly, government consumption is
assumed to follow an autoregressive (AR) process with ﬁxed estimated parameters.
Prior to estimation, the following data transformations have been made:
• We measure real GDP, consumption, investment, extra-euro area exports and im-
ports, the relevant deﬂators, wages and foreign demand in terms of quarter-on-
quarter growth rates, approximated by the ﬁrst diﬀerence of their logarithm.
• We remove excess mean growth, relative to real GDP, from extra-euro area exports
and imports and foreign demand, to guarantee that these variables are commensu-
rate with the balanced-growth-path property of the model.
• We take the logarithm of government consumption and remove a linear trend con-
sistent with our assumptions of trend labour force growth of 0.8 percent and trend
labour productivity growth of 1.2 percent, both growth rates being expressed at an
annual rate.25
25That is, the model, which is implicitly deﬁned in terms of per-capita variables, implies a trend growth
rate of 2.0 percent per annum for all observed real variables.
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• We take the logarithm of employment and remove a linear trend consistent with
our assumption of trend labour-force growth of 0.8 percent at an annual rate, not-
ing that, in the absence of a reliable measure of hours worked, we use data on
employment in the estimation.26
• We construct a measure of the real eﬀective exchange of the euro from the nominal
eﬀective exchange rate, the domestic GDP deﬂator and the foreign GDP deﬂator
and then remove the mean.
• We deﬂate the competitors’ price on the export side with the foreign GDP deﬂator
and remove the existing linear trend.
The graphs of the transformed time series are depicted in Figure 1.
3.2.2. Shocks
Out of the total of 22 structural shocks incorporated in the outlined speciﬁcation of the
NAWM (including shocks to the inﬂation objective and the 6 tax rates), we employ a
subset of 12 shocks, plus the 5 shocks of the autoregression and the structural VAR used to
model the time series of government consumption and the foreign variables, respectively:27
• transitory technology shock (ε) • export preference shock (ν∗)
• permanent technology shock (gz) • interest rate shock (ηR)
• domestic risk premium shock (RP ) • external risk premium shock (RP ∗)
• wage markup shock (ϕW ) • shock to governm. consumption (ηG)
• investment-speciﬁc techn. shock (I) • shock to competitors’ prices (ηP c,∗X )
• import demand shock (IM ) • shock to foreign demand (ηY d,∗)
• price markup shock: domestic (ϕH) • shock to foreign inﬂation (ηΠ∗Y )
• price markup shock: exports (ϕX) • shock to foreign interest rate (ηR∗)
• price markup shock: imports (ϕ∗)
All shocks are assumed to follow ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes, except for the price
markup shocks, the interest rate shock and the shocks in the AR model for government
26We relate the employment variable to the unobserved hours-worked variable by an auxiliary equation
following Smets and Wouters (2003),
Êt =
β
1 + β
Et[Êt+1] +
1
1 + β
Êt−1 +
(1− βξE) (1− ξE)
(1 + β) ξE
(
N̂t − Êt
)
,
where a hat (‘̂ ’) denotes the logarithmic deviation from trend in the case of employment and from the
steady-state value in the case of hours worked. The parameter ξE determines the sensitivity of employment
with respect to hours worked.
27That is, we do not include the consumption preference shock, C , the labour supply shock, N , and the
export demand shock, X , whereas the inﬂation objective and the tax rates are assumed to be constant.
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consumption and the structural VAR model for the foreign variables, which are all assumed
to be serially uncorrelated. In addition, we allow for measurement error in extra-euro area
trade data (both volumes and prices) and in the data on real GDP and the GDP deﬂator,
owing to prevailing problems regarding the measurement of the extra-euro area trade data
and the consequences this may have for the measurement of GDP.28
3.3. Calibration and Prior Distributions
3.3.1. Calibration
We follow the literature and ﬁrst set key steady-state ratios—including the ratios of the
various nominal aggregate demand components over nominal GDP—equal to their empirical
counterparts over our estimation sample. For example, the ratios of private consumption
and total investment spending are set to 57.5 and 21 percent, respectively, while the export
and import ratios are set equal to 16 percent. The trend growth rate in labour productivity
gz is calibrated to equal 1.2 percent per annum, while the long-run (net) inﬂation objective
Π¯ − 1 is assumed to be 2.0 percent at an annualised rate. The discount factor β is then
chosen to imply an annualised equilibrium real interest rate of 2.5 percent.
Further, we ﬁx a number of additional parameters that are inherently diﬃcult to identify
empirically. This involves setting the capital share in production α to 0.3 and the depreci-
ation rate δ to 0.025, as commonly assumed in the literature. The steady-state wage and
price markups ϕW , ϕH , ϕX and ϕ∗ are set uniformly to 0.20, broadly in line with empirical
ﬁndings of studies conducted at the OECD (cf. Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat, 1996, and Jean
and Nicoletti, 2002). Notice that we also set the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply
to 2, reﬂecting the observation that most macro studies overstate the elasticity of labour
supply. Regarding ﬁnal-goods production, we choose values for the home-bias parameters
νC and νI that allow the model to replicate the import content of consumption and invest-
ment spending—roughly 10 and 6 percent, expressed as ratios of nominal GDP—utilising
information from input-output tables (cf. Statistics Netherlands, 2006). The intratemporal
elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported intermediate goods µC and µI
are uniformly set to 1.5, noting that, in the short run, these elasticities may vary depending
on the size of the adjustment costs associated with changing the respective import content.
28We calibrate the standard deviations of the measurement errors for real GDP, the GDP deﬂator and the
import price deﬂator such that the measurement errors explains less than ﬁve percent of their forecast-error
variances, while we estimate the standard deviation of the measurement errors for trade volume data, σω.
23
Finally, using data from OECD (2004) and Eurostat (2006), the tax rates on consumption
purchases, labour and capital income and the contribution rates to social security are cal-
ibrated with τC = 18.3, τN = 12.2, τK = 0.30, τWh = 11.8 and τWf = 21.9, respectively.
Due to lack of reliable information the tax rate on dividend income τD is set to zero.
3.3.2. Prior Distributions
The left-hand columns in Table 1 summarise our assumptions regarding the prior dis-
tribution of the 43 parameters that we estimate. The prior assumptions for most of the
parameters of the domestic economy are similar to those chosen by Smets and Wouters
(2003), while the prior assumptions for the open-economy parameters follow closely those
in Adolfson et al. (2005).
For those parameters where theory implies boundedness between 0 and 1, a beta distribu-
tion is assumed as prior distribution. This group of parameters comprises the habit forma-
tion parameter, the Calvo and indexation parameters underlying the wage and price-setting
decisions of households and ﬁrms, the degree of interest-rate smoothing in the interest-rate
rule, the Calvo-style adjustment parameter in the employment equation and the degree of
serial correlation of the structural shocks. Regarding the wage-setting decision of house-
holds and the price-setting decision of domestic ﬁrms selling their outputs at home, the
prior means for both the Calvo and the indexation parameters are set to 0.75. In contrast,
the prior means for the respective parameters of domestic ﬁrms selling abroad and for for-
eign exporters are set to 0.5, reﬂecting the higher volatility and lower persistence of import
and export price inﬂation. The prior mean for the autoregressive coeﬃcients of those shock
processes featuring serial correlation is set to 0.85. Finally, the prior mean of the parameter
determining the degree of interest-rate smoothing is set to 0.9.
The prior distributions for the remaining parameters of the interest-rate rule are modelled
as normal distributions. The particular choice of these prior distributions follows Smets and
Wouters (2003) and ensures determinacy of the model solution under the prior parametrisa-
tion. In particular, the means of the prior distributions equal 1.7 for the inﬂation response,
0.3 for the response to the change in inﬂation, 0.125 for the output gap response and 0.0625
for the response to the change in the output gap.
Those structural parameters that are only bounded from below are modelled using a
gamma distribution. This group of parameters comprises the various adjustment cost pa-
rameters. Finally, the prior distribution for the standard deviations of the structural shocks
follow inverse gamma distributions.
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3.4. Estimation Results
The right-hand columns in Table 1 report our benchmark estimation results for the
NAWM.29 The entries in the posterior-mode column give the values of the structural param-
eters obtained by maximising the posterior distribution with respect to these parameters.
The next column shows the respective standard deviations. The remaining three columns
report the mean, and the 5th and 95th percentile of the posterior distribution obtained
from the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm based on 250,000 draws.
The plots of the prior and posterior distributions in Figure 2 give an indication of how
informative the observed data are about the structural parameters. For those parameters
where the posterior distribution turns out to be close to the prior distribution, the data
are likely to be rather uninformative. Thus, Figure 2 suggests that the observed data
provide additional information for all parameters, except for the inﬂation response in the
interest-rate rule (φπ), which is a frequent ﬁnding in the literature.
Regarding the price and wage-setting parameters, we observe that the estimated Calvo
parameter for the domestic intermediate goods sold at home is rather high, which implies a
rather low sensitivity of domestic inﬂation with respect to movements in aggregate marginal
cost. This result is likely to depend on the chosen sample period. While our estimation
is based on data ranging from 1985 to 2005, Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate their
model on data from 1980 to 1999 and ﬁnd a somewhat higher sensitivity. This is in line
with empirical evidence that the slope coeﬃcient of Phillips-curve relationships has been
declining over recent years.30 In contrast, the Calvo parameters for setting the price of
intermediate goods sold abroad and for setting wages are noticeably lower. Similarly, the
Calvo parameter governing the price-setting decisions of foreign exporters is found to be
relatively low, causing a signiﬁcant reduction in the degree of exchange-rate pass-through
on the euro area’s import side in the short to medium run.
In the NAWM, imports of foreign intermediate goods are used as inputs for the pro-
duction of the ﬁnal consumption and investment goods. The estimates of the adjustment
29Notice that in estimating our preferred speciﬁcation, we restrict 4 out of 42 parameters, based on the
marginal likelihood that we obtained for diﬀering speciﬁcations (see Christoﬀel, Coenen and Warne (2007)
for sensitivity analysis of the benchmark estimation results). In particular, in our preferred speciﬁcation
we do not allow for variable capital utilisation. Furthermore, we ﬁx at their prior means the indexation
parameters in the price-setting decisions of domestic and foreign exporters, as well as the sensitivity of the
foreign intermediation premium to net foreign assets. These parameters are found to be inherently diﬃcult
to identify.
30In fact, as shown in Figure 3, recursively estimating the model over the years 1999 to 2005 indicates
that the estimate of the Calvo parameter is increasing over this period, corroborating the empirical evidence
of a ﬂattening of the Phillips curve.
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cost parameters associated with changing the import content diﬀers substantially between
the consumption and the investment good. Speciﬁcally, the estimated cost of changing
the import content of the consumption good (γIMC ) is substantially higher than the cost
associated with changing the import content of the investment good (γIMI ). Comparing
posterior and prior distributions in Figure 2, we observe that this result is strongly driven
by the data. Apparently, the relative smoothness of the consumption series implies that
shocks aﬀecting import quantities are mainly transmitted via adjustments in the import
content of investment.
The estimation results for the parameters determining the real side of the domestic econ-
omy are broadly comparable to the results in Smets and Wouters (2003). However, we
obtain a somewhat higher estimate for the degree of habit formation, even though the dif-
ferences in the speciﬁcation of the utility function dilute the direct comparability. Similarly,
the estimated response coeﬃcients of the interest-rate rule are broadly in line with the esti-
mates in Smets and Wouters (2003). The estimated inﬂation response is safely above unity,
ensuring determinacy of the equilibrium, while the response to the output gap is positive,
albeit small. We also ﬁnd supportive evidence for a relatively high degree of interest-rate
smoothing.
4. Unconditional Forecasting
As pointed out by Adolfson, Linde´ and Villani (2007), one important dimension for evalu-
ating the empirical ﬁt of a model in a policy environment is its out-of-sample forecasting
performance. In this section we will examine the forecasting properties of the NAWM
against a number of benchmarks. The purpose is not to ﬁnd the best forecasting model,
but to check if the unconditional forecasts generated by the NAWM are “reasonable”; i.e.,
to examine if the forecasting performance of the model is not considerably worse than that
of the benchmarks.
In this regard we may evaluate the forecasting performance in a number of dimensions.
First, we may consider standard univariate statistics such as mean forecast errors and root
mean-squared forecast errors (RMSEs). Similarly, we may calculate multivariate statistics
for point forecasts such as the log-determinant statistic and the trace statistic. An advantage
of such statistics is that they take the multivariate nature of many forecasting situations
into account. At the same time, they are sensitive to the performance across the most
predictable dimensions; see, e.g., Adolfson, Linde´ and Villani (2007). The multivariate
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statistics thus run the risk of being dominated by a speciﬁc variable which may be of little
interest.31 In this paper we focus on the univariate mean error and RMSE statistics, but
we shall also report multivariate statistics for the variables we are primarily interested in.
4.1. Forecasting with the NAWM
Let θ ∈ Θ be a vector with structural parameters for the log-linearised NAWM that we
estimate. Given that a unique convergent solution exists at a particular value for the
parameter vector, we can express the relationship between the model variables, deﬁned as
deviations from the steady state, and the parameters as a VAR system. Speciﬁcally, let
ηt be a q-dimensional vector with i.i.d. standard normal structural shocks, (ηt ∼ N(0, Iq)),
while ξt is an r-dimensional vector of model variables for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The solution
(reduced form) of the log-linearised NAWM can now be represented by:
ξt = Fξt−1 +Bηt, t = 1, . . . , T, (66)
where F and B are uniquely determined by θ. The observed variables are denoted by yt,
an n-dimensional vector, which is linked to the model variables ξt through the equation
yt = A′xt +H ′ξt + wt, t = 1, . . . , T. (67)
The k-dimensional vector xt is here assumed to be deterministic, while wt is a vector of i.i.d.
normal measurement errors with mean zero and covariance matrix R. The measurement
errors and the shocks ηt are assumed to be independent, while the matrices A, H, and R
are uniquely determined by θ.
The system in (66) and (67) is a state-space model with ξt being partially unobserved
(if r > n) state variables. Equation (66) gives the state transition equation and (67)
the measurement equation. Provided the number of measurement errors and structural
shocks is large enough, we can calculate the likelihood function for the observed data YT =
{y1, . . . , yT } via the Kalman ﬁlter; see, e.g., Hamilton (1994) for details. The ﬁlter can also
be used to estimate all unobserved variables in the model at the given value for θ.
Out-of-sample forecasts are calculated for the sample T + 1, . . . , T + h, and the model-
consistent forecasts will be calculated as in Adolfson, Linde´ and Villani (2007). The pre-
dictive distribution of yT+1, . . . , yT+h can be expressed as
p
(
yT+1, . . . , yT+h|YT
)
=
∫
p
(
yT+1, . . . , yT+h|θ,YT
)
p
(
θ|YT
)
dθ, (68)
31Forecasting performance may also be evaluated from the perspective of forecast intervals and density
forecasts more generally; see, e.g., Dawid (1982) and Geweke (1999), as well as the study by Adolfson, Linde´
and Villani (2007).
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where p(θ|YT ) is the posterior distribution of θ based on all available information at T .
Since the integral in (68) cannot be evaluated analytically we use the numerical algorithm
suggested by Adolfson, Linde´ and Villani (2007). That is,
(1) Simulate θ from p(θ|YT );
(2) Simulate the state variables at time T from ξT ∼ N(ξT |T , PT |T ), where ξT |T is the
ﬁlter estimate of ξT and PT |T is the covariance matrix of ξT given θ and YT ;
(3) Simulate a path for the state variables from (66) using the simulated value for
ξT as initial value and a sequence of simulated values for the structural shocks
ηT+1, . . . , ηT+h from N(0, Iq);
(4) Simulate a sequence of measurement errors wT+1, . . . , wT+h from N(0, R) and com-
pute the path for the observed variables yT+1, . . . , yT+h using the measurement
equation (67);
(5) Repeat steps 2-4 N1 times for the same θ;
(6) Repeat steps 1-5 N2 times.
The algorithm thus gives N1 · N2 paths from the predictive distribution in (68). Point
and interval forecasts can then be calculated in a straightforward manner, and in our case
we use the mean as the point estimate and equal-tail 68 and 90 percent interval forecasts.
The number of paths per parameter draw (N1) and the number of parameters draws (N2)
are both set to 500 in the empirical exercises.
4.2. Forecasting with a Bayesian VAR
Bayesian vector autoregressions (BVARs) have long been considered a useful forecasting
tool; see Litterman (1986). The BVAR we study is based on the parameterisation and prior
studied by Villani (2005). That is, we consider a VAR model with a prior on the steady-
state parameters, and a Minnesota-style prior on parameters on lags of the endogenous
variables; see also Adolfson, Linde´ and Villani (2007).
The VAR model for the p-dimensional covariance stationary vector zt is given by:
zt = Ψdt +
k∑
l=1
Πl
(
zt−l −Ψdt−l
)
+ εt, t = 1, . . . , T. (69)
The d-dimensional vector dt is deterministic, and the residuals εt are assumed to be i.i.d.
normal with zero mean and positive deﬁnite covariance matrix Ω. The Πl matrix is p × p
for all lags, while Ψ is p × d and measures the expected value of xt conditional on the
parameters and other information available at t = 0.
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One advantage with the parameterisation in (69) is, as pointed out by Villani (2005),
that the steady-state (or mean) of the endogenous variables is directly parameterised via
Ψ. For the standard parameterisation of a VAR model the parameters on the deterministic
variables are written as Φ = (Ip−
∑k
l=1 Πl)Ψ when dt = 1. This makes it diﬃcult to specify a
prior on Φ which gives rise to a reasonable prior distribution on the steady-state. Moreover,
when zt is a subset of the observed variables used in the estimation of the NAWM, then
we can directly form a prior on the steady state of zt that is consistent with the steady-
state prior for the NAWM as captured by a prior on A. This allows for a more balanced
comparison between the models since they can share the same prior mean, or steady-state,
for the variables that appear in both models. The steady-state in the NAWM is calibrated,
while the steady-state prior covariance matrix is positive deﬁnite for the BVAR. Hence,
some imbalance between the models remains for the steady-state parameters.32
Let p(Ψ,Π,Ω|ZT ) denote the posterior density where Π = [Π1 · · · Πk] and ZT =
{z1, . . . , zT }. Simulation from this distribution is performed via Gibbs sampling for the
three groups of parameters Ψ, Π, and Ω using the full conditional posteriors given by
Villani (2005, Proposition 2.1). Out-of-sample forecasts for the BVAR are calculated for
the sample T + 1, . . . , T + h, with the objective of estimating the prediction distribution
p(zT+1, . . . , zT+h|ZT ). The algorithm used for a BVAR was adapted to a multivariate set-
ting by Villani (2001) from the univariate approach suggested by Thompson and Miller
(1986). That is,
(1) Simulate (Ψ,Π,Ω) from p(Ψ,Π,Ω|ZT );
(2) Simulate residuals εT+1, . . . , εT+h from N(0,Ω) and calculate a path for the endoge-
nous variables zT+1, . . . , zT+h using the VAR in (69);
(3) Repeat step 2 N1 times for the same (Ψ,Π,Ω);
(4) Repeat steps 1-3 N2 times.
Like for the NAWM we set N1 = N2 = 500 and calculate the mean from the predictive
distribution as well as equal-tail 68 and 90 percent interval forecasts.
4.3. Results
In this section we will focus on a comparison between the NAWM, a BVAR, and two na¨ıve
forecasts regarding mean errors and root mean-squared errors (RMSEs). The na¨ıve forecasts
are given by a random walk (the last pre-forecast sample observation as the forecast) and
32Details on the BVAR model speciﬁcation are given in Appendix A.
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the pre-forecast sample mean (random walk with drift for the accumulated variable, e.g.,
the level of real GDP). The forecast sample is given by the period 1999Q1-2005Q4 and thus
covers the period following the introduction of the euro. For both the BVAR and the NAWM
the parameter estimates are updated annually with quarter 4 being the update period, while
the forecasts are calculated out-of-sample. The point forecasts from the NAWM are given
by the mean of the predictive distributions, while the point forecasts from the BVAR are
currently given by the mean of the predictive distributions conditional on the posterior
mode estimate of the parameters.
The mean errors for the four forecasts are displayed in Figure 4. Regarding year-on-year
real GDP growth it is striking that all forecasts except those obtained from the NAWM
have negative mean errors; i.e., these models tend to overpredict real GDP growth. The
NAWM, on the other hand, tends to underpredict real GDP growth over the ﬁrst year. For
longer forecast horizons, the NAWM has smaller mean errors (in absolute terms) than the
other models and, hence, it has a smaller bias. For shorter forecast horizons, the random
walk has the smallest mean errors (in absolute terms).
Turning to GDP deﬂator inﬂation, we ﬁnd that the NAWM, the BVAR, and the random
walk underpredict this variable. The sample mean, on the other hand, greatly overpredicts
inﬂation. Since the errors are very large (in absolute terms) we have dropped them from
the graph. In addition, the mean errors are increasing over the forecast horizon.
Finally, we ﬁnd that, on average, the nominal interest rate is overpredicted by all forecast
models, with the NAWM performing worse than both the random walk and the BVAR. For
the NAWM we also ﬁnd that the forecast errors are increasing with the forecast horizon.
As in the case of GDP deﬂator inﬂation, the mean errors from the sample mean are too
large (in absolute terms) to ﬁt into the ﬁgure.
The results on RMSEs are shown in Figure 5 for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-
on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate. It can be seen here that the
NAWM fares quite well in comparison to the BVAR and the na¨ıve forecasts. The main
exception is for real GDP growth where the sample mean does best from the 4th through
the 8th quarter.33
In Figure 6 we have plotted rolling mean predictions from the NAWM and the BVAR.
Focusing on year-on-year real GDP growth, it is noteworthy that the NAWM is unable to
33It may be noted that the RMSEs of GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the nominal interest rate for the sample
mean are much larger than those for the other forecasts.
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predict the recovery at the very beginning of the forecast sample, while the BVAR fares
better. In contrast, the 2000-2001 slow-down in economic activity and the subsequent
recovery is well predicted by the NAWM, while the na¨ıve benchmarks are, by construction,
unable to capture this event. At the same time the length of the recovery that begins in
2002 is overestimated by the NAWM, while the BVAR roughly gets the length but not the
height of the recovery right.
The poor performance for the BVAR regarding GDP deﬂator inﬂation is evident from
Figure 6 where it on average under-predicts inﬂation. It appears that the choice of steady-
state prior covariance matrix is not important for explaining this result. In particular,
lowering the variance for the steady-state prior on domestic and foreign inﬂation does not
aﬀect the predictions from the BVAR to any great extent.34
We have plotted the mean predictions and equal-tail prediction intervals for the prediction
sample beginning with 2001Q2 in Figure 7. The CEPR Business Cycle Dating Committee
(2003) notes that the euro area has essentially stagnated since 2001Q1, even though the
downturn thereafter is not regarded as a recession. It can be seen that euro area real
GDP growth had already started to decline prior to early 2001 (the peak is located at
2000Q2). Based on our data the NAWM predicts that real GDP growth will continue to
fall until early 2002 and thereafter pick up again. This actually corresponds very well with
what happended. The mean predictions from the BVAR, in contrast, are fairly ﬂat at the
observed growth rate for 2001Q1, and therefore completely fail for this forecast period. For
the GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the nominal interest rate predictions, the results from the
NAWM and the BVAR are similar. It is worth noting that the prediction intervals are much
tighter for the BVAR when it comes to the inﬂation predictions, especially for the longer
horizons.
[Multivariate forecast performance measures based on the h-steps ahead MSE matrix will
be added in the next draft.]
5. Conditional Forecasting with the NAWM
Conditional forecasting concerns forecasts of endogenous variables conditional on a certain
path and length of path for some other endogenous variables; see, e.g., Waggoner and Zha
(1999). In this section we will discuss conditional forecasting as we have implemented it
for the NAWM. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that the conditioning information satisﬁes hard
34We are currently considering alternative speciﬁcations of the prior on the parameters on lagged endoge-
nous variables.
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conditions (a particular path) rather than soft conditions (a range for the path). Following
Leeper and Zha (2003) we also assume that selected shocks are manipulated to ensure
that the conditioning information is met by the predictions; for alternative approaches, see
Waggoner and Zha (1999), and Robertson, Tallman and Whiteman (2005).
The assumption that particular shocks can be picked is not restrictive for the majority of
the conditioning variables that we will consider. The reason is that only a certain subset of
the shocks can aﬀect these variables. Speciﬁcally, the argument applies in particular to real
government consumption and the four foreign variables, which are exogenous for the other
observed variables. At the same, we will also condition on the nominal interest rate and
the nominal exchange rate, where the Waggoner and Zha approach is a relevant alternative.
Furthermore, in view of the Lucas (1976) critique we will evaluate the reasonableness of the
conditioning assumptions by the modesty statistics developed by Leeper and Zha (2003)
and Adolfson, Lase´en, Linde´ and Villani (2005).
5.1. Implementation of the Conditioning Assumptions
Let K1 and K2 be known n× qm matrices with n > qm such that rank(K1) = qm. Further-
more, consider the following relation:
cT+i = K ′1yT+i +
i−1∑
j=1
K ′2yT+i−j + uT , i = 1, . . . , g, (70)
where the conditioning horizon g is less than or equal to the forecast horizon h.
The speciﬁcation in equation (70) is general enough to satisfy our purposes. In the
special case where K2 = 0 and uT = 0 the conditioning vector cT+i is determined directly
from yT+i; e.g., from one particular observed variable. Although such a speciﬁcation covers
many interesting cases it does not allow us to handle the case when yT+i includes the real
exchange rate and the ﬁrst diﬀerences of domestic and foreign prices, but where cT+i is
the nominal exchange rate. For example, let pY,t and p∗Y,t denote the domestic and foreign
GDP deﬂators, respectively, while snt denotes the nominal exchange rate. We may then let
K1 be deﬁned such that K ′1yT+i = (snT+i + p
∗
Y,T+i − pY,T+i) + ∆pY,T+i −∆p∗Y,T+i, whereas
K ′2yT+i−j = ∆pY,T+i−j −∆p∗Y,T+i−j and uT = pY,T − p∗Y,T .
To our knowledge the use of conditioning information that only partially restricts the
future path of observed variables has not been considered previously in the literature. More-
over, the speciﬁcation in (70) can easily be extended to handle ﬁrst diﬀerences and annual
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diﬀerences of observed variables without complicating the algorithms provided below to any
great extent.
To keep the values in cT+i ﬁxed over the given horizon we require that a subset of the
structural shocks are adjusted to take on certain values. The selection of structural shocks
is determined by the q × qm matrix M , where q > qm and rank(M) = qm. Let M⊥ be the
q × (q − qm) orthogonal matrix; i.e., M ′⊥M = 0. It now follows that N = [M⊥ M ] is a full
rank q × q matrix, while
N ′ηt =
[
M ′⊥
M ′
]
ηt =
[
η
(q−qm)
t
η
(qm)
t
]
. (71)
The shocks η(qm)t will be adjusted over the time interval t = T +1, . . . , T + g to ensure that
(70) is met for all forecast paths of the observed variables over this time interval.
With M¯ = M(M ′M)−1 and M¯⊥ = M⊥(M ′⊥M⊥)
−1 it is straightforward to show that the
values for the structural shocks which guarantee that the conditioning path cT+1, . . . , cT+g
in (70) is always met are:
η
(qm)
T+i =
(
K ′1H
′BM¯
)−1[
cT+i −K ′1A′xT+i −K ′1wT+i −K ′1H ′Fξ(qm)T+i−1
−K ′1H ′BM¯⊥η(q−qm)T+i −K ′2
i−1∑
j=1
y
(qm)
T+i−j − uT
]
, i = 1, . . . , g,
(72)
while the states and the observed variables evolve according to:
ξ
(qm)
T+i = Fξ
(qm)
T+i−1 +BM¯⊥η
(q−qm)
T+i +BM¯η
(qm)
T+i , i = 1, . . . , g, (73)
and
y
(qm)
T+i = A
′xT+i +H ′ξ
(qm)
T+i + wT+i, i = 1, . . . , g, (74)
with ξ(qm)T = ξT . It should be noted that the calculations involve the assumption that the
matrix K ′1H ′BM¯ has full rank qm. This is not a strong condition since H ′B must have rank
n for the structural shocks to be uniquely determined from the data and the parameters,
while qm is always less than n.
For i > g there are not any direct restrictions on the possible paths for the observed
variables other than that the state vector at T + g needs to be taken into account.
Estimation of the predictive distribution for yT+1, . . . , yT+h, taking the conditioning as-
sumptions into account, can now be achieved as follows:
(1) Simulate θ from p(θ|YT );
(2) Simulate the state variables at time T from ξT ∼ N(ξT |T , PT |T ), where ξT |T is the
ﬁlter estimate of ξT and PT |T is the covariance matrix of ξT given θ and YT ;
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(3) Simulate a sequence of structural shocks ηT+1, . . . , ηT+h from N(0, Iq) and a se-
quence of measurement errors wT+1, . . . , wT+h from N(0, R);
(4) Calculate the restricted shocks η(qm)T+i , states ξ
(qm)
T+i , and the conditioning information
consistent observed values y(qm)T+i for i = 1, . . . , g using equations (72)-(74);
(5) If g < h calculate the remaining states ξT+g+1, . . . , ξT+h using the structural shocks
ηT+g+1, . . . , ηT+h and the initial value for the states ξ
(qm)
T+g from the state equation
(66), and the remaining observed variables yT+g+1, . . . , yT+h using the measurement
equation (67);
(6) Repeat steps 2-5 N1 times for the same θ;
(7) Repeat steps 1-6 N2 times.
It should be pointed out that this algorithm assumes that the conditioning information is
not informative about the unknown parameters. The approach suggested by Waggoner and
Zha (1999) for VAR models is not subject to this technical weakness.
5.2. The Conditioning Information
Below we will study three nested conditioning information sets of increasing size. For all
such sets the structural shocks that need to be ﬁxed over the conditioning horizon are also
speciﬁed. The latter is here equal to the forecast horizon; i.e., g = h = 8 quarters.
A: The nominal interest rate is assumed to be ﬁxed at the last observed value over
the conditioning horizon. That is, we condition on the assumption of unchanged
interest rates, as in the ECB’s macroeconomic projections over the relevant sample
period. As in Adolfson, Lase´en, Linde´ and Villani (2005), the monetary policy shock
is manipulated to ensure the assumed path.
B: In addition to A, the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed at the last observed value
over the conditioning horizon. That is, we condition on a random walk for the
nominal eﬀective exchange rate, as opposed to determining the exchange rate by
the uncovered interest parity condition implied by the log-linearised NAWM. The
external risk premium shock is added to the set of shocks in η(qm).
C: In addition to the variables and shocks in B, all 4 foreign variables and real gov-
ernment consumption are assumed to take on their ex-post realisations. The added
shocks are the 4 foreign shocks and the government consumption shock.
The extra conditioning assumptions in C relative to B concern exogenous variables in the
NAWM and, hence, the selection of additional shocks is natural. Moreover, this part of the
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NAWM does not involve any parameters in θ. Hence, this subset of the conditioning set
is indeed uninformative about θ. The choice of ex-post realisations is, however, potentially
strong as it does not match a proper projection situation in real time.35 Moreover, since
parameters for the AR-process for government consumption as well as the SVAR system
for the foreign variables is calibrated based on estimates obtained from the sample 1985Q1-
2005Q4, the shocks needed to obtain the ex-post path for these variables will be equal to
those found when the NAWM is estimated over the full sample. Hence, we expect these
shocks to be modest by construction.
5.3. Comparisons with the Unconditional Forecasts
Before we turn our attention to the modesty tests it is interesting to compare the perfor-
mance of the unconditional forecasts for the NAWM to the three sets of conditioning data.
The mean forecast errors for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-on-real GDP deﬂator
inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are displayed in Figure 8.
For real GDP growth we ﬁnd that the conditioning information leads to smaller forecast
errors (in absolute terms) until quarter 6. From that point on the unconditional forecasts
have the smallest bias. While it is not surprising that using future data for real government
consumption and the foreign variable can improve short-term real GDP forecasts, it is
perhaps surprising that conditioning on a constant nominal interest rate leads to smaller
short-term forecast errors. This is, however, most likely related to the somewhat worse
performance of the NAWM relative to the random walk forecast for the nominal interest
rate. In this context, it may also be recalled that the steady-state nominal interest rate in
the NAWM is 4.5 percent, which is higher than the realised interest rate over most of the
forecast sample.
Turning to GDP deﬂator inﬂation we ﬁnd that the impact of the conditioning data is
small for the mean errors. In particular, for conditioning set A (constant nominal interest
rate) the mean errors are roughly the same as for the unconditional forecasts. Once the
assumption of a constant nominal exchange rate is added, the mean errors tend to fall,
especially for the longer horizons.
The RMSEs for the 4 forecast cases are shown in Figure 9. The RMSEs under condi-
tioning are smaller for real GDP predictions than those for the unconditional forecasts for
short-term forecasts. This is in line with the evidence we have reported above for the mean
35We will consider using real-time assumptions for the foreign variables and real government consumption
instead of the ex-post realisations.
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errors. Furthermore, the RMSEs for GDP deﬂator inﬂation are similar across the diﬀerent
conditioning assumptions. Again, conditioning set A leads to the smallest change relative
to the unconditional forecasts.
In Figure 10 we have plotted the mean for the unconditional predictive density along
with the 68 percent prediction bands, as well as the mean predictions and the 68 percent
prediction bands under the three conditioning sets. In the upper part of the Figure we ﬁnd
the results for year-on-year real GDP and in the lower part the evidence for year-on-year
GDP deﬂator inﬂation. As in Figure 7 we focus on forecasts that begin in 2001Q2.
For GDP deﬂator inﬂation it is noteworthy that the conditioning information has only
a minor impact on the predictions. For real GDP growth, however, the mean predictions
as well as the equal-tail prediction bands shift downwards relative to the unconditional
predictions. In particular, when all the conditioning assumptions are used (conditioning set
C), then the prediction for 2002Q1 are shifted downward by roughly 0.5 percent.
Summarising our comparison between the unconditional and conditional forecasts with
the NAWM, we have found that the impact of the conditioning assumptions is not extreme
when it comes to the performance for the point forecasts. For real GDP growth the con-
ditioning data improves the forecasts at the shorter horizons. This is especially true when
conditioning set C is applied.
5.4. Modesty Statistics
Since the conditional forecasts rely on manipulating structural shocks that, by assumption,
have zero mean and are uncorrelated with the history of the observed variables, there is
no guarantee that the values that we obtain for the manipulated shocks will be consistent
with this assumption. In other words, the experiment may be subject to the Lucas (1976)
critique since the agents should be able to detect substantial changes in the behavior of
the shocks. To assess the relevance of the Lucas critique we shall evaluate the conditional
forecasts through modesty statistics developed by Leeper and Zha (2003) (LZ) for VAR
models and further reﬁned by Adolfson, Lase´en, Linde´ and Villani (2005) (ALLV) to DSGE
models as well as to a multivariate setting.
The basic idea behind a modesty statistic is to compare the conditional forecasts with the
unconditional forecasts, accounting for the forecast error variance under the unconditional
forecast. If the conditioning assumptions are modest, then the resulting t-statistic should
be standard normal. The statistic in LZ is formulated in terms of a VAR model and it
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is assumed that all shocks apart from those that are manipulated are set to zero over the
forecast horizon. Moreover, all parameters and current and past values of the variables are
treated as known since the economic agents within the model have no uncertainty about
them. This statistic has been extended to DSGE (state-space) models by ALLV. They also
note that it is more natural to take the uncertainty of all other shocks into account, especially
when the other shocks account for the bulk of the forecast uncertainty of a variable. Apart
from setting the modesty statistic in a more realistic environment, this extension allows for
a multivariate treatment of the Lucas critique since the forecast error covariance matrix for
all the observed variables will no longer be singular.
The question of how to treat the parameters when calculating the modesty tests, however,
remains open. As mentioned above, the agents of the model are assumed to know the “true
value” of θ, and ALLV uses the posterior mode estimate when computing the modesty
statistics. This is one candidate, but we may just as well use some other point estimator
such as the posterior mean or the median. This emphasises that from the econometrician’s
perspective the choice of parameter value is subject to uncertainty and there is no guarantee
that diﬀerent point estimators will give qualitatively similar results. Since the Bayesian
framework allows us to account for parameter uncertainty we shall also utilise the posterior
distribution. In this paper we will only consider extending the ALLV multivariate statistic,
calculated as in their study but for diﬀerent draws from the posterior. Like in ALLV we
compare the multivariate statistic to a reference statistic that is calculated in the same way
as the modesty statistic, except that the shocks that were originally manipulated are now
drawn from their distribution. This gives us a total of N1 ·N2 values of each statistic and
we calculate the tail probability by recording how many time the modesty statistic is less
than or equal to the reference statistic divided by the number of times each statistic has
been computed.
The modesty statistics when the parameters are given by the posterior mode estimates
are shown in Figure 11. Rolling values of the univariate statistics (based on the posterior
mode estimate of θ) for the 8-steps ahead forecasts are displayed in the ﬁrst two ﬁgure
columns, while the multivariate statistics (for the posterior mode estimate) are located in
the third ﬁgure column. The evidence for the three conditioning sets is given in the ﬁgure
rows. The vertical axis gives the tail probabilities of the statistics, while the horizontal axis
gives the start date for the 8-steps ahead forecasts. Hence, the values for 2004Q1 concern
the forecast that begins at that date and ends at 2005Q4.
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It is striking that the tail probabilities for the univariate LZ statistics ﬂuctuate consid-
erably more than those for the univariate ALLV test. This is primarily due to the lower
forecast error variances for the LZ statistics, where only the variances of the shocks that
are manipulated are taken into account. A few large (but not necessarily unusually large)
shocks may therefore greatly aﬀect particular values of the LZ statistic. In the case of GDP
deﬂator inﬂation, the LZ statistics signal that the conditioning assumptions in the sets A
and B may not be regarded as modest over the 1999-2000 period. The univariate ALLV
statistics, in contrast, yield high tail probabilities that ﬂuctuate relatively little over the
forecast sample. These latter results are supported by the multivariate statistics, which in
particular under conditioning sets A and B are very stable at 50 percent.
One interpretation of the results for the univariate and multivariate ALLV statistics has
already been touched upon. In Section 5.2 it was noted that the government consumption
and foreign shocks are likely to be modest over the conditioning sample since the condi-
tioning data are the ex-post realisations and the processes for these variables are calibrated
based on estimates for the full sample. For conditioning set A we use the assumption that
the nominal interest rate follows a random walk. When comparing the forecasting perfor-
mance between the NAWM unconditionally and under conditioning set A we have found
that the random walk assumption tends to improve the forecasts somewhat in terms of
bias. However, the impact seems to be relatively small and the lack of modesty based on
the ALLV statistics may therefore not be so surprising.
For conditioning set B we add the assumption that the nominal exchange rate follows a
random walk. It is a well established empirical result for nominal exchange rate predictions
that the random walk model is diﬃcult to beat. If the forecasts of the nominal exchange rate
from the NAWM are close to the random walk forecasts we expect the modesty statistics
to be small. Once we add the conditioning assumptions in C, taking the above comments
about these exogenous variables into account, the ALLV based modesty results may also be
understood under this conditioning set.
[Multivariate modesty statistics based on draws from p(θ|YT ) to be added in the next
draft.]
5.5. Prediction Event Probabilities
One important advantage of a Bayesian approach to forecasting is that we can calculate
probabilities of certain events over the forecast sample. For example, we may want to know
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what the probability is that consumer price inﬂation at some point is greater than, say, 2
percent. Similarly, we may want to learn how big the probability of the economy going into
a recession is. The algorithms for estimating the unconditional and conditional prediction
distributions that are discussed in Sections 4 and 5 make it straightforward to calculate the
probabilities of such prediction events.
In this section we are concerned with 5 diﬀerent events for 3 observed variables. First,
we deﬁne a recession as the case when year-on-year real GDP growth is negative for at least
3 consecutive quarters. Next, we wish to know what the probability is that year-on-year
GDP deﬂator inﬂation lies between 0 and 2 percent, as well as the probability that it falls
below 0 percent. Finally, the same two events are considered for year-on-year consumption
deﬂator inﬂation.
The empirical results are summarised in Figure 12. The dates on the horizontal axis refer
to the ﬁrst forecast period. It is noteworthy that all predictive distributions give roughly
the same prediction event probabilities over the forecast sample. The largest diﬀerences
are found for the recession probabilities from late 2000 to early 2001. The most restrictive
conditioning set (C) yields higher recession probabilities at the beginning of this period,
suggesting that the ex-post realisation of the foreign variables are important indicators.
During this period the probabilities that year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation lies between
0 and 2 percent is roughly 25 percent, while the probabilities of deﬂation is no more than 10
percent. Hence, the probability of GDP deﬂator inﬂation rising above 2 percent is regarded
as quite high. For the year-on-year consumption deﬂator, the probability of inﬂation rising
above 2 percent is somewhat lower, but nevertheless indicating a stronger upward than
downward risk for price stability.
In connection with the close to zero nominal interest rates in Japan, there was heightened
concern for deﬂationary risks also in the U.S. and in Europe. During the period 2003-2004
the deﬂation probabilities in the lower part of Figure 12 are slowly rising for both the GDP
deﬂator and the consumption deﬂator series. The values reach about 20 percent for the
GDP deﬂator and 30 percent for the consumption deﬂator. This may be compared with
deﬂation probablities around 10 (15) percent for the GDP (consumption) deﬂator during
the 2000-2001 period.
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6. Conclusion
We examined conditional versus unconditional forecasting with a version of the NAWM,
an estimated small open-economy model of the euro area designed for use in the macroe-
conomic projections at the ECB. In terms of forecasting performance, we showed that the
NAWM fares quite well compared to a BVAR and the random walk, in particular in the
case of real GDP growth and GDP inﬂation for horizons that extend beyond one year. We
then demonstrated that conditioning the model-based forecasts on a large set of policy-
relevant variables helps to improve the forecasting performance over some horizons, albeit
not systematically. At the same time, we showed that conditioning on alternative informa-
tion sets does not bias the forecasts. This is in line with our ﬁnding that the conditioning
assumptions are modest in the sense of Leeper and Zha, at least as long as the multivariate
nature of the underlying shock uncertainty is taken into account. As regards our analysis
of certain prediction events, we identiﬁed a heightened probability of a recession in 2001
which is broadly similar across information sets, even though it is more pronounced when
conditioning on (ex post) foreign data.
In the future we will examine the forecast performance on the basis of all observed
variables used in the estimation of the NAWM. In this context we plan to compare the results
for the NAWM with those obtained from larger BVARs including additional variables.
Moreover, we shall consider replacing the ex-post realisations of government consumption
and the foreign variables with real-time assumptions. Finally we plan to take parameter
uncertainty into account for the modesty statistics.
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Appendix A: The Specification of the BVAR
As in Villani (2005) we assume that Ψ is a priori independent of Πl and Ω with vec(Ψ) ∼
N(µψ,Σψ) and Σψ being positive deﬁnite. Regarding the parameters on lags of the endoge-
nous variables we deﬁne Π = [Π1 · · · Πk] and assume that vec(Π) ∼ N(µπ,Σπ). Finally, a
diﬀuse prior on Ω is used as represented by the well-known form p(Ω) ∝ |Ω|−(p+1)/2.
To parameterise the prior on Π we assume that the prior mean of Πl is zero for all
l ≥ 2. For the ﬁrst lag all oﬀ-diagonal elements are assumed to be zero, while the diagonal
elements are equal to λD when zi,t is a ﬁrst diﬀerenced variable (e.g., real GDP growth),
and given by λL when zi,t is a levels variables (e.g., the nominal interest rate). Regarding
the parameterisation of Σπ we use a Minnesota-style prior. Letting Πij,l denote the element
in row (equation) i and column (on variable) j for lag l, the matrix Σπ is assumed to be
diagonal with
Var
(
Πij,l
)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
λo
lλh
, if i = j,
λoλcΩii
lλhΩjj
, otherwise.
The parameter Ωii is simply the variance of the residual in equation i and, hence, the ratio
Ωii/Ωjj takes into account that variable i and variable j may have diﬀerent scales.
Formally, this parameterisation is inconsistent with the prior being a marginal distribu-
tion since it depends on Ω. As is standard for the Minnesota-type of prior we deal with this
by replacing the Ωii parameters with the maximum likelihood estimate. The hyperparame-
ter λo > 0 gives the overall tightness of the prior around the mean, while 0 < λc < 1 is the
cross-equation tightness hyperparameter. Finally, the hyperparameter λh > 0 measures the
harmonic lag decay.
In the empirical application the BVAR model has 7 variables that are taken from the
observed variable set for NAWM. The variables we have selected are the same type of
variables as were used by Adolfson, Anderson, Linde´, Villani and Vredin (2005) in their
BVAR. They are: real GDP growth, GDP deﬂator inﬂation, nominal interest rate, real
exchange rate, growth rate of real foreign demand, foreign GDP deﬂator inﬂation, and the
foreign interest rate. For the steady state we let:
µ′ψ =
[
0.5 0.5 4.5 0 0.5 0.5 4.5
]
, diag(Σψ)′ =
[
1 1 5 20 1 1 5
]
,
while all oﬀ-diagonal elements of Σψ are zero. For real GDP growth and inﬂation the mean
steady-state values concern the quarterly rates. The hyperparameters for the Πl parameters
are given by λL = 0.9, λD = 0, λo = λc = 0.5, while λh = 1. The variables viewed as ﬁrst
diﬀerenced variables are domestic real GDP growth and real foreign demand growth, while
all other variables are viewed as levels variables. The lag order, k, is set to 4.
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Table 1: Prior and Benchmark Posterior Distributions
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type mean std/df mode std mean 5% 95%
Preferences
Habit formation κ beta 0.700 0.05 0.671 0.039 0.673 0.596 0.758
Wage and price setting
Calvo parameter: wages ξW beta 0.750 0.05 0.841 0.026 0.838 0.775 0.893
Indexation: wages χW beta 0.750 0.15 0.340 0.115 0.312 0.151 0.510
Calvo parameter: domestic ξH beta 0.750 0.05 0.944 0.006 0.944 0.931 0.956
Indexation: domestic χH beta 0.750 0.15 0.660 0.058 0.684 0.561 0.811
Calvo parameter: exports ξX beta 0.500 0.10 0.815 0.031 0.812 0.743 0.870
Indexation: exports χX beta 0.500 0.15 0.500 — — — —
Adjustment costs
Investment γI gamma 4.000 0.75 5.834 0.678 5.883 4.562 7.322
Capital utilisation γu,2 gamma 0.010 0.01 106 — — — —
Import content: cons. γIMC gamma 2.500 1.00 6.080 1.020 6.207 4.362 8.390
Import content: invest. γIMI gamma 2.500 1.00 0.526 0.121 0.544 0.306 0.847
Financial intermediation γB gamma 0.010 0.01 0.010 — — — —
Foreign ex- and importers
Calvo parameter: imports ξ beta 0.500 0.10 0.778 0.031 0.774 0.700 0.841
Indexation: imports χ beta 0.500 0.15 0.500 — — — —
Export price elasticity µ gamma 1.500 0.25 0.954 0.081 0.939 0.691 1.227
Export adjustment cost γ gamma 2.500 1.00 1.321 0.183 1.309 0.859 1.846
Monetary policy
Interest-rate smoothing φR beta 0.900 0.05 0.910 0.016 0.895 0.842 0.934
Resp. to inﬂation φΠ normal 1.700 0.10 1.733 0.092 1.728 1.564 1.893
Resp. to inﬂation diﬀ. φ∆Π normal 0.300 0.10 0.109 0.039 0.122 0.050 0.194
Resp. to output gap φY normal 0.125 0.05 0.205 0.039 0.220 0.135 0.299
Resp. to output gap diﬀ. φ∆Y normal 0.0625 0.05 0.111 0.025 0.093 0.027 0.153
Employment
Calvo-style parameter ξE beta 0.500 0.15 0.859 0.007 0.859 0.834 0.883
Autoregressive coeﬃcients
Transitory techn. shock ρε beta 0.850 0.10 0.904 0.017 0.902 0.849 0.945
Permanent techn. shock ρgz beta 0.850 0.10 0.532 0.116 0.643 0.420 0.853
Risk premium shock: dom. ρRP beta 0.850 0.10 0.909 0.015 0.906 0.858 0.909
Wage markup shock ρϕW beta 0.850 0.10 0.583 0.033 0.601 0.500 0.945
Inv.-spec. techn. shock ρI beta 0.850 0.10 0.594 0.053 0.563 0.375 0.744
Import demand shock ρIM beta 0.850 0.10 0.855 0.023 0.854 0.800 0.897
Export pref. shock ρν beta 0.850 0.10 0.902 0.019 0.906 0.857 0.945
Risk premium shock: ext. ρRP∗ beta 0.850 0.10 0.893 0.013 0.892 0.842 0.935
Standard deviations
Transitory techn. shock σε inv. gamma 0.857 2.00 1.024 0.079 1.094 0.801 1.482
Permanent techn. shock σgz inv. gamma 0.245 2.00 0.205 0.026 0.197 0.139 0.257
Risk premium shock: dom. σRP inv. gamma 0.245 2.00 0.230 0.025 0.238 0.167 0.331
Wage markup shock σϕW inv. gamma 0.184 2.00 0.111 0.009 0.109 0.086 0.136
Inv.-spec. techn. shock σI inv. gamma 0.245 2.00 0.459 0.037 0.481 0.377 0.597
Import demand shock σIM inv. gamma 0.245 2.00 5.327 0.421 5.441 4.480 6.626
Price markup shock: dom. σϕH inv. gamma 0.184 2.00 0.176 0.014 0.179 0.154 0.209
Price markup shock: exp. σϕX inv. gamma 0.367 2.00 1.396 0.123 1.421 1.186 1.699
Price markup shock: imp. σϕ∗ inv. gamma 0.367 2.00 2.288 0.193 2.329 1.946 2.789
Export pref. shock σν∗ inv. gamma 0.245 2.00 5.043 0.385 5.061 3.601 6.892
Interest rate shock σR inv. gamma 0.122 2.00 0.112 0.009 0.112 0.094 0.132
Risk premium shock: ext σRP∗ inv. gamma 0.245 2.00 0.379 0.031 0.384 0.283 0.507
Measurement error σω inv. gamma 0.245 2.00 1.105 0.090 1.115 0.977 1.275
Note: This table provides information on the prior distributions as well as the benchmark posterior distributions for the
NAWM.
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Figure 4: Mean Errors of Unconditional Forecasts for the NAWM, a BVAR, and Two
Na¨ıve Forecasts
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Note: For the NAWM, a BVAR with steady-state prior and two na¨ıve forecasts (the random walk and the
sample mean), this ﬁgure shows the mean errors (in percent) of unconditional 1-8 period-ahead forecasts
for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the annual nominal interest
rate. The forecasts have been computed recursively out of sample over the period 1999Q1-2005Q4, and
the point forecasts for computing the mean errors are given by the means of the predictive densities.
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Figure 5: Root Mean-Squared Errors of Unconditional Forecasts for the NAWM, a BVAR,
and Two Na¨ıve Forecasts
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Note: For the NAWM, a BVAR with steady-state prior and two na¨ıve forecasts (the random walk and
the sample mean), this ﬁgure shows the root mean-squared errors (RMSEs, in percent) of unconditional
1-8 period-ahead forecasts for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the
annual nominal interest rate. The forecasts have been computed recursively out of sample over the period
1999Q1-2005Q4, and the point forecasts for computing the RMSEs are given by the means of the predictive
densities.
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Figure 6: Mean Prediction Paths from the NAWM and a BVAR for Selected Variables
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Note: For the NAWM and a BVAR with steady-state prior, this ﬁgure shows the mean prediction paths
of unconditional 1-8 period-ahead forecasts for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-on-year GDP deﬂator
inﬂation and the annual nominal interest rate. The forecasts have been computed recursively out of sample
over the period 1999Q1-2005Q4.
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Figure 7: Mean Predictions and Centred Prediction Intervals for the NAWM and a BVAR
for the Prediction Sample 2001Q2-2003Q1
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Note: For the NAWM and a BVAR with steady-state prior, this ﬁgure shows the unconditional mean
predictions and the equal-tail 68 and 90 percent prediction intervals for year-on-year real GDP growth,
year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the annual nominal interest rate in the period 2001Q1 characterised
by a slow-down in economic activity.
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Figure 8: Mean Errors of Unconditional and Conditional Forecasts for the NAWM
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Note: For the NAWM, this ﬁgure compares the mean errors (in percent) of unconditional 1-8 period-ahead
forecasts for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation and the annual nominal
interest rate with those obtained under the alternative conditioning assumptions A to C. The forecasts
have been computed recursively out of sample over the period 1999Q1-2005Q4, and the point forecasts for
computing the mean errors are given by the means of the predictive densities.
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Figure 9: Root Mean-Squared Errors of Unconditional and Conditional Forecasts for the
NAWM
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Note: For the NAWM, this ﬁgure compares the root mean-squared errors (RMSEs, in percent) of uncon-
ditional 1-8 period-ahead forecasts for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation
and the annual nominal interest rate with those obtained under the alternative conditioning assumptions
A to C. The forecasts have been computed recursively out of sample over the period 1999Q1-2005Q4, and
the point forecasts for computing the RMSEs are given by the means of the predictive densities.
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Figure 10: Unconditional and Conditional Mean Predictions and Centred Prediction In-
tervals for the NAWM for the Prediction Sample 2001Q2-2003Q1
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Note: For the NAWM, this ﬁgure compares the unconditional mean predictions and the equal-tail 68
percent prediction intervals for year-on-year real GDP growth, year-on-year GDP deﬂator inﬂation and
the annual nominal interest rate in the period 2001Q1 characterised by a slow-down in economic activity
with those obtained under the alternative conditioning assumptions A to C.
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Figure 11: Tail Probabilities from Univariate and Multivariate Modesty Statistics of the
Conditioning Information Sets for the NAWM
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Note: For the NAWM and the three diﬀerent conditioning information sets A to C, this ﬁgure shows the
tail probabilities of three alternative modesty statistics for assessing the relevance of the Lucas critique:
the univariate statistic proposed by Leeper and Zha (2003) (LZ) as well as the univariate and multivariate
extensions proposed by Adolfson et al. (2005) (ALLV) taking into account the multivariate nature of the
underlying shock uncertainty. The conditional forecasts have been computed recursively out of sample
over the period 1999Q1-2005Q4, and the modesty statistics are evaluated at the posterior mode of the
model parameters for a conditioning sample length of eight quarters.
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Figure 12: Prediction Event Probabilities
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Note: For the unconditional and conditional predictive distributions obtained for the NAWM over the
horizon 1999Q1-2005Q4, this ﬁgures depicts the probabilities of certain prediction events for real GDP
growth, GDP deﬂator inﬂation and consumer price inﬂation.
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